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ABSTRACT
/
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the
events leading up to the Bay of Pigs debacle to determine
how a venture so greatly misconceived came to be approved.
The study gives attention to the beginnings of the exile
brigade in the Eisenhower administration, how the election
campaign influenced its growth, and the evolution and com
mitment in the Kennedy administration.
The procedure involved a review of the historical
backgrounds, an objective chronicle of the disaster, and
a look at the national and midwest reaction and response.
The study is based on accounts written by those who par
ticipated in decision making, press interviews with members
of the invasion force, and on-the-spot stories as related in
books, newspapers, and magazines.
The results emphasize some of the inherent weaknesses
of our system of government and how virtually impossible it
is to engage in operations of this size and keep them secret
in an open society.
In conclusion, Cuba is a dramatic demonstration of the
ineptness of United States Latin-American policies or lack
of policies; a demonstration also of prevailing American at
titudes to any revolutionary change.

The concept of trying

to impose a right-wing government on Cuba that would imme
diately be labelled a Yankee creation was completely wrong.
vi

CHAPTER I

/

■ r ■'

Introduction
When Columbus discovered Cuba, in the course of his
first voyage, on Sunday October 28, llj.92, he was so im
pressed, he said:
have ever seen."

"It is the most beautiful land human eyes
The island was one of Spain's first foot

holds in the new world, remained a Spanish colony for lj.00
years, and was the last colony to gain its independence.
Cuba has been dominated by foreign power almost from the
time of Columbus.

After it was lost to Spain it fell under

the shadow of the United States, and is now, under Castro,
thought to be the target of communist takeover.
Diego Velasquez, with a force of 300 men, began the
conquest of the island in 13>11.

It was first used by the

Spaniards as a stepping stone to wider discoveries in the
New World, and following the period of explorations,

it be

came a base of supplies for the Spanish fleet moving to and
from the New World.

A plantation economy to supply local

needs and also provisions for the ships that called created
a need for a large labor supply.

The rapid destruction of

the Indians made necessary the importation of slave labor,
which began in 15>22.

It was this period also that saw the

beginnings of the large sugar plantation which soon ruled
the island and became both a curse and a blessing to it
1

2
in the years that followed.
Almost from its beginning as an independent nation,
the United States has looked longingly at Cuba.

The early
>
sense of Manifest Destiny, beginning with the purchase of
Louisiana in 1803 and the acquisition of Florida in 1819,
created an appetite for ever-expanding frontiers, and the
conviction grew that Cuba must some day be included in the
Union of States.
Jefferson was the first to describe a Latin-American
policy when he suggested the exclusion of European influ
ence from this hemisphere.

What he probably had in mind

was the exclusion of Spain's authority and the substitution
of United States sovereignty in Cuba as well as Florida.
The No-transfer Resolution of l8ll stated that no part of
Florida territory should pass into the hands of a foreign
power.

In 1823 John Quincy Adams extended this to include

Cuba.3
England and France, fearing United States ambitions,
proposed in 18^2 a tripartite agreement that the three pow
ers "severally and collectively disclaim, now and for here
after, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of
iHubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the
Beginnings to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
19jj3>), PP« 393-96 passim.
^Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of
The United States (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1943), p. 2 8.
^Ibid., p. 30 .

3
Cuba."

Secretary of State Edward Everett in his famous

reply disclaimed for his government any coveting of Cuba
but refused to bind the United States against ever ac
quiring the Pearl of the Antilles:
The United States . . . would . . . disable them
selves from making an acquisition which might take
place without any disturbance of existing foreign
relations, and in the natural order of things.
The island of Cuba lies at our doors.
It commands
the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes
the shores of five of our States.
It bars the en
trance of that great river which drains half the
North American continent, . . . It keeps watch at
the door-way of our intercourse with California
and the Isthmus route.hThe islands closeness to the United States, and the possi
bility of its fine harbors being used by enemy navies to
threaten the nation’s commerce was the reason for its early
interest.

With the expanding commerce with Cuba, and be

cause of its strategic position in respect to the Panama
Canal, United States felt the need to secure a naval base
there.
When other Spanish colonies declared their indepen
dence of Spain early in the nineteenth century, despite
its discontent and restiveness, Cuba did not.

Failure to

move for freedom was in part a lack of effective aid from
the outside and in part a lack of agreement among Cubans
themselves as to what they wanted--autonomy within the Spa
nish Empire, annexation with the United States, or com
plete independence.

As time went on, desire for inde

pendence increased, especially as Spanish repressive

^4-Ibid., p . 96.

measures increased.

In 1837 Spain excluded Cuban deputies

from the Spanish cortes and said Cuba would now be governed
by "special laws."
Into this scene was injected the desire on the part
many United States groups to annex Cuba.

Proslavery ele

ments, especially, wanted the island to offset the growing
power of the antislavery forces in the United States Cong
ress.

Preebooting expeditions originating on the mainland

were attempted.

Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan who had fought
/
under the Spanish flag against Bolivar, later moved to Cuba

where he shifted to the patriot side against the mother
country.

He was forced to flee to the United States where

he recruited three filibustering invasions to the island-in l8Ij.8 , 1850, and l85l; all failed and Lopez was caught
and garroted as a traitor.-'
Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan tried in vain to
purchase Cuba from Spain.

A secret offer of $100 million

was made, but Spain angrily rejected it.

The American

ministers to Spain, Prance, and England then contrived to
gether and issued the Ostend Manifesto, which announced
American intention either to buy Cuba or to take it "with
out consent of Spain.
^Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United
States, p . 95•
^Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of
a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p . 12
This is a study of the Castro Revolution by the co-editors
of the socialist Monthly Review.

Sporadic revolts continued and increased and in 1868
Cubans rose in armed rebellion, contending that Cuba "nat
urally belonged" to the Cubans.

For ten years the Cuban

struggle for independence, with declining vigor, kept the
island in confusion.

War ended in 1878 when Spain made

promises of sweeping government reforms, amnesty for poli
tical prisoners, liberty for rebel slaves, abolition of
slavery, and representation in the cortes.7

Eighty thou

sand Spanish soldiers died and a half a billion dollars was
spent by the mother country, as a result of Spain's failure
to bring badly needed reforms to Cuba.

Much of the Cuban

countryside was laid waste, representing complete loss to
the farmers, and some American merchants who had financed
Cuban sugar estates picked up additional properties at
advantageous prices.®
The struggle for political freedom continued. The
/
f
Cuban people, spurred on by the writings of Jose Marti, re
belled again in l895--a continuation of the Ten Years War.
Spain dispatched more than 200,000 men to Cuba under the
command of General Valeriano Wyler, who earned for himself
the epithet of el carnicero, the butcher.

Several thousand

men, women, and children were herded into concentration
camps, where inadequate food and lack of sanitation brought
?Jenks, Leland Hamilton, Our Cuban Colony (New York:
Vanguard Press, 1928), pp. 13-17.
O
°Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution
p . 12.

6
death to many thousands and also brought the sympathy of
the American people, who clamored for intervention.
In 1898 when the battleship Maine was blown up in
Havana harbor, United States public opinion demanded war
against Spain.

Many forces provoked American intervention:

American investments wanted their profits protected; the
pending Isthmian Canal made it unwise to leave Spain in
control of the island that dominated the Caribbean; Hearst
and Pulitzer, in an effort to sell papers, sold the war to
9
the American public.
Spanish rule ceased on December 10, 1898, and was fol
lowed immediately by United States military rule.

A stable

government was established, yellow fever eradicated, the
island economy bolstered, great new public facilities con
structed.

America generously provided, but neglected to

provide what Cubans wanted most--independence.

A Cuban

Constitutional Convention met and adopted a constitution on
February 21, 1901; the American Congress met and adopted
the Platt Amendment and demanded that it be a part of the
Cuban Constitution.

Herring said:

not free to make her own mistakes.

"Cuba was now free--but
That was the meaning

implicit in the Platt Amendment, under whose protection, or
threat, Cuba lived for thirty-two years."*
10
°Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba:

American troops

Anatomy of a Revolution,

p . 13.
10Herring, A History of Latin America, p. l\.00.

7
intervened under the Amendment for the first time in 1906,
a second time in 1912, and a third time in 1917*

In 1920

American political and financial advisors controlled the

/

Cuban government without benefit of troops.
Cuba is rich in many resources, but sugar has always
dominated the island.

In the l880’s and 1890's American

investment in sugar plantations greatly increased, by 1896
it was valued at $30 million.

Investments were not con

fined to this one industry however:

Bethlehem Steel and

Rockefeller interests invested heavily in mining proper
ties.

By 1896 American investments in Cuba totaled

million.

In 1903? a reciprocity treaty approved by Con

gress, gave Cuban imports a tariff reduction of 20 percent,
and American products going into Cuba a like amount.

This

meant that American refiners could buy Cuban sugar cheaper
than the price on the open market, and made it possible,
through increased demand, for Cuban sugar producers to
expand their output.

The import rates into Cuba gave Amer

ican farmers and manufacturers advantages over other coun
tries.

This distortion of free enterprise made Cuba depen

dent on American imports instead of developing her own
resources

11

During the First World War, a shortage of sugar re
sulted in tremendous profit and expansion in the industry.
■^Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p p . 31-35 passim.

8
In the aftermath, however, as prices went down to an alltime low, sugar millowners could not repay their loans to
the banks; banks could not pay their depositors and were
forced to close.

The large Cuban banks, the Banco Nacional

and the Banco Espanol, were taken over by the National City
Bank of New York.

By the 1950’s Americans owned 90 percent

of the telephone and electric services, 50 percent of the
public service railroads, and about ipO percent of the raw
sugar production.

American capital dominated the islands

economy. 12
/
In 1902 Tomas Estrada Palma became the first presi
dent of the new republic.

Huberman and Sweezy described

the years that followed:
There came a succession of Presidents whose terms
were characterized by venality, nepotism, incom
petence, graft, and despotism.
Some were elected
to office by ballots, others seized or held power
by bullets. Two^of the better of, a thoroughly bad
lot were Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin and Dr. Carlos
Prio Socarras; two of the^worst, General Gerardo
Machado and Sergeant Fulge'ncio Batista, . . were
bloody dictators whose regimes were nightmares of
repression, assassination, gangsterism, bribery,
and corrupt ion .13
As a result of violent political agitation and charges
/
✓
of corruption against Carlos Prio Soccarras, Batista over/
threw the government and sent Prio into exile. He closed
Congress and called for elections in 195^4-, and was elected
l^Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,
p p . 11-19; Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Carib
bean (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966),
pp. 31-35.
^Huberman and Sweezy, Cuba:
p. 17.

Anatomy of a Revolution,

9
without opposition for a four-year term.

Batista ruled by

the grace of the army but was also a shrewd politician.
Aware of the middle-class Cubans desire for public office
he used patronage to gain their support.

He won the sup

port of organized labor by improving wages and working con
ditions.

When opposition developed among the intellectuals,

Batista was so well-entrenched behind the backing of the
military, the middle-class officeholders, and organized
labor, he could face it without fear.

The last years of

Batista's regime, particularly from 195b to 1959, were
marked by growing repression, terrorism, and violent repris
als against growing strength of anti-Batista forces who
organized a campaign of harassment in the provinces.
Ray Brennan, reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times, pre
sented some disturbing facts about the Batista regime.

"For

five years or more the six million people of Cuba were to
know the whiplash of cruel oppression.
sand of them were murdered.

. . . The tortures and mutila

tions were almost beyond belief."
a closed lid on the news.
could not prove them.

About nineteen thou

Strict censorship kept

Reporters heard of atrocitios but

However, Arthur Gardner and his suc

cessor, Earl T. Smith, United States ambassadors to Cuba,
who were frequent guests of the dictator and had consular
officials reporting to them from the interior of Cuba,". . .
could not have avoided hearing of the hellish conditions, .
. . It was certainly the ambassadors' duty to report fully

10
to the State Department if they knew about it."-*-^
Batista's dictatorship was illegal, yet, the United
States sold warplanes, bombs, guns, and ammunition, that,
were being used by a tyrant to kill his subjects.

On

August 26, 1958, Miro Cardona wrote a letter to Eisenhower
asking him to withdraw help to Batista, particularly to stop
sending arms and ammunition.

The reply when it came stated:

The United States believes in the democratic
election process and the choice by the people,
through free and fair election or democratic
government responsive to them. . . . At the
same time United States does follow a strict
policy of nonintervention in domestic affairs
of sister republics. . . . The military equip
ment supplied by the United States to Cuba was
in the interest of hemispheric defense.^5
The attack on Batista’s dictatorship began among uni
versity students.

On July 26, 1953? a rebel army of some

200 men, mostly young students, stormed the Moncada army
barracks in Santiago.

About half of them were killed by

machine gun fire, others were captured, horribly tortured,
then put in jail to wait trial--among them, their leader
Fidel Castro and his brother Raul.

It was a continuation

of the revolution that began in 1868.
Fidel Castro was sentenced to fifteen years in prison,
but eleven months later, under the pressure of public
-*-^-Ray Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice (New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), p . 26. The story is based
on first hand information, including data obtained by the
author when he was with Castro and his rebels in Sierra
Maestra mountains and in the underground.
-*-^Hub erman

p. 17.

and Sweezy, Cuba:

Anatomy of a Revolution.
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opinion, amnesty was granted.

In July, 1955* Fidel went to

Mexico to gather arms and men for an invasion of Cuba, and
on December 2, 1956, he landed with 82 men on the south
eastern coast.

Most of the men were shot by a Batista army

troop, but about a dozen, including Fidel, his brother Raul,
and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine-born physician who
had spent a good part of his life fighting against dictator
ship in Argentina and later in Guatemala, escaped into the
Sierra Maestra."^
The next two years saw the development of the resist
ance movement that was to topple Batista.
words:

In Brennan's

"The word spread through Oriente Province.

Rebels were good, kind men.
farmer they paid for it.

The

If they obtained food from a

If they had no money they went

hungry. . . . The fidelistas became heroes, almost gods, to
the countryfolk." ^

Theodore Draper gives this account:

. . . as the months passed the relations be
tween the Rebels and the peasants took a new
dimension. The crying poverty, illiteracy, dis
ease, and primitivism of the outcast peasants
appalled the young city-bred ex-students. Out
of this came a determination to revolutionize
Cuban society, raising the lowest and most
^Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York:
George Braziller, Inc., 1961), p p . 15-i+ij passim. This book
is the result of a secret interview in the Sierra Maestra,
in spite of the vigilance of Batista's troops, between
Matthews, a New York Times reporter, and Fidel Castro.
-^Brennan, Castro, Cuba and Justice, p p . 127-28.

12
neglected sector to a civilized level of well
being and human dignity.
In the months to follow these guajiros, or farmfolk, were
to have a mighty part in turning back Batista's army and''
in winning the victory that came on New Year's day, 1959,
as the overthrown dictator, Batista and his family, sought
asylum in Santo Domingo.
The victory of the Left in Cuba was the natural out
come of years of social and economic discontent.
from the beginning a communist movement?

Was it

Did it become

communist when the United States used "economic" pressure
against it, and forced it to turn elsewhere for help?

Is

it now communist, or simply a people's social and economic
revolution based on Marxist principles?

These were the

questions that brought about the aberration called the
"Bay of Pigs."
xoTheodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p . 11.

<

CHAPTER II
Chronicle of Disaster

The story begins on March 17, I960, whon it appeared
to the Eisenhower administration that Fidel Castro had sold
out to the communists, bringing in the Soviet Union and Red
China as full partners in the Cuban Revolution.

It had

also become apparent that Latin America was reluctant to
1
act against Castro.
Cuban exiles arriving in Miami in ever greater num
bers were seeking support for means of overthrowing Castro.
The administration, influenced by the course of events in
Cuba and the growing pressure of the refugees for action,
2
agreed to help organize a force of Cuban exiles.
No- one
knew what was about to take place in Cuba, but a welltrained cadre of guerrillas would be useful if conditions
warranted their use.
^"Hell of a Beating in Cuba," Life, April 28, 1961,
p. 172

Theodore Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy,"
The New Leader, June 5, 1961, p. 11.
-^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days:
John
F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), p. 226.
13

The implementation of the decision to organize a
Cuban brigade, which required the greatest secrecy, was
entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency.
vided into two parts:

It was di/
On the political side it directed

the CIA to bring together a broad range of Cuban exiles,
with batistianos (followers of Pulgencio Batista) and ex
iles professing communist ideology specifically excluded,
into unified political opposition to the Castro regime.

On

the military side it authorized the CIA to train and equip
a Cuban guerrilla force that might be used against Castro.^Overall command was given to Allen W. Dulles, di
rector of CIA.

Mr. Dulles began his service during the

First World War under Woodrow Wilson.

During the Eisen

hower administration, his brother was Secretary of State
and his agency had become increasingly involved in hand
ling political operations without supervision.

He was to

have general supervision but the day-to-day responsibility
was given to one of the deputies in the CIA, Richard
Bissell, Jr.

Both men were experienced in intelligence

work, mostly in Europe, but never in Latin America.

Nei

ther had ever commanded troops.-^
^Ibid.
q
-^Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p . 77• The
authors followed the Cuban Revolution from its first days
and knew most of the leaders whose decisions played a
part in the story, so they had much first-hand informa
tion to draw upon.

15
The first migration of Cubans coming to this country,
numbering only a few thousand, had all been batistianos.
These were completely without support in Cuba.

Then came

the frightened rich, persons who had served neither Ba£
tista or Castro.
According to Schlesinger, these "were
characteristically identified with the old Cuba of the tra
ditional parties, of progressive intent and ineffectual
performance.

Some were decent men; others were racketeers

who had found politics a lucrative way of life."^

Follow

ing these came, also representing the political right,
businessmen, teachers, professionals, and intellectuals.
They stood for the Cuba of the past.
It was to such men that the CIA turned when it be
gan to organize the political front in the early months of
I960.

There were almost as many groups and factions as

there were Cuban refugees.

In June, five of the leading

groups were asked to form the Frente Revolucionario Demo-

8 Out of this

/

cratico, which became known as the Frente.

group was chosen a directorate of five members.
these represented pre-Batista Cuba:

Three of

Manuel Antonio Varona,

a former premier who had served in the government of Presi
dent Carlos Prio Socarras (the man Batista overthrew in*
8
/
Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," The New
Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 6.
"^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 2778Ibid.
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1952); Dr. Justo Carillo, a man of liberal views, who had
been president of the Bank for Industrial and Agricultural
/
Development under both Prio and Castro and had been foreign
'
/
minister in one of Prio's cabinets, and Aureliano Sanchez
Arango, who had been Minister of Education.

The other two

were Jose/ Ignacio Rasco, a courageous young man who had led
the small Christian Democratic party in Cuba, and a young
lieutenant named Manuel Artime Buesa, who had joined Castro
at the end of 1958 and later worked for Castro's National
Q
Institute of Agrarian Reform.
This man Artime, who was to play such an important
role in the counterrevolution, was in many respects an
unlikely candidate for a political role.

He was twenty-

eight, had a degree as a medical doctor, and was trained as
a psychiatrist.10

He was chief of the exile section of the

Movement of Revolutionary Recovery (MRR), a secret organ
ization composed of former rebel army officers.

He was the

only one of the five men on the directorate who could claim
any important connections with the Cuban underground.
Soon after he broke with the regime in November 1959, the
II
CIA brought him out of Cuba.
Meyer and Szulc in The
^Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs (New York:
¥. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), p . 307 This is the story as
told by four of the brigade leaders after they were freed
from Cuban prisons.
1QIbid.
llnBitter Week:
1961, p. 11.

The Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28

17
Cuban Invasion said:

"His youth, his military experience,

his political inexperience and his personal tractability
all recommended him to the CIA field operatives."

12

He

/
became their man in the Frente and was soon the only link
between the CIA's political and military operations.
The Frente was well named; it was a front and noth
ing else.

No sooner had the pact been signed than it was

followed by dissension among its members.

Meyer and Szulc

felt from the outset "an unhealthy dependence on the CIA
characterized the organization."

It was provided with a

headquarters building on Miami's Biscayne Boulevard and an
office at Coral Gables.

In addition, "The CIA paid the

salary of many of the officials and invested money in its
newspapers and propaganda activities."

13

While the members of the Frente sat quibbling, the
CIA was busy recruiting refugees in Florida and Central
America, and persuaded President Ydigoras of Guatemala to
allow the use of land near the mountains of his country for
an air base and a secret training camp.

By late July work

ers began preparing an air strip in Guatemala to serve the
rebel air force that was needed for supply missions flown
to the Cuban underground.

The first CIA plan was to form

small groups that would slip into Cuba where there were al
ready active centers of resistance, and arms and supplies1
2
3
12

Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 26.

13Ibid., p. 27.
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would be flown in.

These groups would enlarge themselves

until they had enough popular support for an uprising.

The

long-range planning called for use of the same planes to
1

land commando groups in Cuba when the uprising began.
By midsummer other Cubans began to arrive in Guat
emala.

It was the rainy season and they had to build their

own camp in sticky, volcanic mud five thousand feet above
the sea.

In their spare time, they received training from

a Filipino colonel who had been in charge of guerrilla
fighting against the Japanese in World War II.

In August

I960 Eisenhower approved a budget of $13 million for the
Cuban project.

According to Schlesinger, it was stipu

lated that "no United States military personnel were to
take part in combat operations .
Meyer and Szulc call attention to a powerful new un
derground movement that had come into being in Cuba.

Sev

eral hundred guerrillas were hiding out in the Escambray
Mountains, and an American-trained young Cuban engineer
Manuel Ray, who had been a member of Castro's cabinet but
resigned when the moderates were being purged by the radi
cals, was now activating his underground in the cities.
This underground movement which was given the name People's
Revolutionary Movement (MRP) was a model of its kind.

The

network spanned the entire island, with an executive coun
cil in each province and lesser commands reaching down to
the smallest village.

The combination of the Escambray

•^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 228.

19
guerrillas and the MRP underground in the cities became the
most important anti-regime operations in Cuba.

These men

had in mind "restoring the revolution to its original
/
goals," said Andrew Tully, "and to continue the social
reforms Castro had initiated.
The CIA strategists had little patience with the un
derground, but because of its stubborness and persistence
it could not be ignored.
assistance.

Plans were belatedly made to give

The rebel aircraft began flying occasional

supply missions over the Escambray Mountains, dropping sup
plies, but it was already too little and too late.

Under

Castro’s pressure the resistance in the mountains eventu
ally collapsed, leaving the MRP as the principal antiCastro movement in Cuba.

It was also having trouble, and

Manuel Ray realized that if he were going to keep his re
sistance group going he would have to have more United
States help.

He arranged to have himself smuggled into

Miami in November I960 to plead his case in person.
While the neglected groups within Cuba suffered from
lack of supplies and direction a deep division became ap
parent in the forces being trained by the CIA.

Artime, the

favorite leader, was edging farther over to the right-wing
groups, while Ray, who according to Szulc, favored "a*
1
6
Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York:
William Morrow and Company, 1962), P* 21|5.
16)
Tad Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look,
July 18, 1961, p. 76.
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democratic anti-communist Cuba, as Castro had promised
. . . was being subjected to a smear campaign, labeling him
a 'dangerous leftist.'"17*
0 CIA men were aware of these at2
9
1
tacks; they knew the high command was opposed to giving
support to anyone too far to the left, consequently, Ray
,
18
received no help.
New waves of refugees continued coming out of Cuba.
This was now the third migration, led by men who had con
spired against Batista and fought with Castro in the rev
olutionary army, and who, like Ray and the MRPs, left when
Castro allegedly turned his social revolution into commu
nism.

These men were politically radical and nationalist,

personally proud and defiant.

Their thesis was that Castro

had to be overthrown from within and that the Cuban people
must be the means. 19y
These groups were serious rivals of the people on the
right who had arrived earlier and who condemned anyone who
had ever belonged to the movement, and especially anyone who
had occupied a post of some responsibility in the Castro
government.

These controversies were of great importance:

whether the underground in Cuba or the exiles in the United
States should lead in the struggle against Castro. PO
17Ibid.
•^Tully, CIA:

The Inside Story, p. 21\S.

19Schle singer, A Thousand Days, p. 231.
20

June

Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," New Leader,
1961.
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In the early stages of planning the project, the CIA
had chosen as their Miami manager and main contact with
exile leaders a man by the name of Prank Bender, whose real
name was Droller, a German refugee who had come to this
country before the war and moved up into army intelligence.
He knew little about Cuba or Latin America and spoke no
Spanish, but, as Meyer and Szulc stated, he had money and
authority, and fell naturally into the role of command.
The new power went to his head--he regarded himself the
most important leader in the counterrevolution.

The older

exiles disliked and feared him, but they felt they had no
choice but to obey him.^l
When Bender ordered Ray and his underground movement
to join the Frente, he met with refusal.

This group posed

a threat to the more conservative exiles who did everything
to discredit them.

They denounced Ray as fidelisimo sin

Fidel--Castroism without Castro.

During the opening months

of 1961 CIA was beginning to have trouble with all groups.
Senior Sanchez Arango, one of the five members of the
directorate, stated:

"The CIA wanted to control everything

. . . . The members who were . . . .

willing to accept

their commands, their orders, their provisions, were the
ones in best relationship with them."
21

22

Manuel Artime2
1

Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 19.

Clifton Daniels, "Pull Story of Bay of Pigs,"
New York Times, June 2, 1966, p. 11.
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Buesa was chosen to lead because he was willing to accept
all their demands.

He was a one-time Castro soldier who

had served Pidel briefly as an official in an Agrarian Re/
form Zone in Oriente. He had very little military experi
ence but was an accomplished orator and his political phil
osophy was basically conservative, which appealed to the
23
y
CIA.
Sanchez Arango argued that the Frente should take
in people with a revolutionary background.

Refusing to do

this and favoring "reliable" exiles, who would take orders,
the CIA endangered the whole project, because the men most
capable of rallying support within Cuba against Castro were
being left o u t . ^
Months had passed since November I960 when President
Eisenhower had approved the forming of a Cuban exile brigl
ade. The manner in which it was to function had not yet
been definitely decided.

By the closing days of the presi

dential campaign of I960 Cuba had become not only the domi
nant issue in the United States but also internationally.
Castro had announced recognition of Red China, torn up a
1952 military pact with the United States, and was seeking
support from Russia and China.

Castro called the United

States a "vulture feeding on humanity."

He dared the United

States to attack and be destroyed, repeatedly charging that
the "Yankee Imperialists" were training for invasion.
2^Tully, CIA:

The Inside Story, p. 21+6.

^Daniels, "Full Story of Bay of Pigs," New York
Times, June 2, 1966, p. 11.

The
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Cuban Minister to United Nations, Raul Roa, demanded an im
mediate meeting of the Security Council to prevent armed
groups of the United States and mercenaries at their ser/
vice from invading C u b a . ^
President Kennedy, who had not yet been briefed on
the Guatemala activity, said in a campaign speech:

"We

must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic
forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual
hope of overthrowing Castro.

Thus far these fighters for

freedom have had virtually no support from our government.”
Richard Nixon, who was aware of the existence of the Guate
malan camp and the United States plans for it, replied:

"I

think that Senator Kennedy's policies and recommendations
for handling the Castro regime are probably the most danger
ously irresponsible recommendations that he has made during
the course of the campaign."

He believed that Kennedy's

call for a support of a revolution in Cuba was "the most
shockingly reckless proposal ever made. . . by a presiden
tial candidate.
While the CIA was working with the counterrevolution
ary forces, the overall planning was debated in Washington
by a special group.

These were high level officials from

the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, and the White
House.

According to Haynes Johnson, the original plan for
^ T h e Minneapolis Tribune, January 1, 1961, p. 1+.
26]3aynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. SO.

2^
a guerrilla operation was scrapped for three reasons:
First, it became apparent that supplying the
guerrillas by air drops, as was planned, would
be extremely difficult; second, as Castro became
more openly allied with the Communist bloc,
heavy shipments of arms and ammunition began
arriving in Cuba; third, Castro's control over
the civilians and militia was tighter than had
been anticipated, making it difficult for even a
long guerrilla campaign to succeed.27
From the original concept of isolated guerrilla landings,
the plan now moved toward the idea of a larger operation
that really amounted to an invasion.^®

President Eisen

hower was apparently unaware of what was going on.

He

later stated that guerrilla training was all that he had
authorized.^9
The CIA sent a long cable to Guatemala, informing the
anti-Castro forces there of the change of plans.

The guer

rilla force was cut to sixty men, and a new training pro
gram was instituted for the others.

The change of plans

met with good response from the Cubans, who turned with en
thusiasm to the idea of an amphibious landing, and the new
type of training and equipment gave them renewed hope.

They

were certain that those left behind in Cuba hated Castro as
much as they did, so they genuinely believed that a mass
27Ibid., p. 53 *
O
°Thomas B. Ross and David Wise, The Invisible
Government (Hew York:
Random House, 1961+) , p3 29.
^ f . j. Cook, "The Case Builds Up," Nation, June 22,
1961+, p. 616.
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landing in Cuba might set off a general revolt.

The Am

erican officers assured them that they would have all the
support they needed.

Pepe San Ramon, a regular army officer

who had served under a democratic regime, a dictatorship,
and most recently and briefly under Fidel Castro said:

"The

American officers always referred to our part in the armed
forces, or our part in the combat,

. . . that this thing

was much bigger and we were just a piece there--one of the
most important pieces--but said there were many, many
groups like ours, and they were all going to be under us.
We were only one tenth of the f o r c e . ( I t a l i c s

mine.)

As later events proved, the American officers had created
a false impression.
On November 29, I960, Allen Dulles gave President
elect Kennedy a detailed briefing on CIA's "new military
conception."

He listened with attention and decided to

allow the preparation to go on for the time being.
said:

He

"There will be ample opportunity after the inau-

guration for review and reconsideration."

32

During the next few weeks neither the outgoing nor
the incoming administration wanted to make committments to
any major decisions.
into Guatemala.

Equipment and men continued to pour

An air base was established in Nicaragua*
3
2

^°Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 232.
J Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 56.
32 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 233-
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from which bomb strikes, in advance of the attack, would
knock out Castro's Air Force.

Scores of Cuban doctors and

nurses who had earlier volunteered for duty were notified
to depart for a hospital ship that was being outfitted
somewhere in Florida.

Many other clandestine groups, some

with bases in the swamps of Florida and Louisiana, others
from Key West in the Florida Keys were organizing for
action against Castro.
By this time the plans were no longer secret.

The

Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a pro-Castro group, asked
Congress to investigate reports that the CIA was planning
an invasion.

The Nation reported on a trip made to Guate

mala by Dr. Ronald Hilton, a Stanford University professor,
who claimed the country was swarming with anti-Castro ex
iles planning an invasion.

It said the CIA was offering

$25,000 for pilots to fly on this mission scheduled for
sometime early in 1961.

The Nation went on to say:

"If

Washington is ignorant of the existence of the base, or is
-e
innocent of any involvement in it, they should scotch all
insidious rumors and issue a full statement of the facts or
if it is true, then public pressure should be brought to
bear upon the administration to abandon this dangerous and
hair-brained |j3icj project.
The United States could not become involved in action
against Cuba without violating the spirit and the letter of
^Editorial, Nation, November 19, I960, p. 50*
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the OAS charter, hemispheric treaties, United Nations
pledge and United States federal legislation.
in military plans brought new problems.

So the change

Schlesinger ez-

/

plained the dilemma:
If the United States kept its role small enough
to conceal its responsibility, the operation
might not have a fair chance of success; while
if it made its role large enough to give the
operation a fair chance of success, the respon
sibility could not be plausibly disclaimed in
case of failure. Washington might then face the
choice between the political humiliation of de
feat and the commitment of United States troops
to insure victory.3d
The new plan also brought the need for stepped up re
cruitment, and in this rush the liberal elements among the
Cuban exiles were swept from positions of influence.

With

out consulting the President or the State Department the
CIA chose to back right-wing groups.
in Look, stated:

Tad Szulc, reporting

"When batistianos streamed into Guatemala,

two hundred of the anti-Castro group rebelled and were
jailed by the right-wing c o m m a n d . T h e

CIA did not real-

ize that men who had taken part in the revolution had a
natural hatred for officers who had served Batista--this was
the group they had fought to overthrow.

When members of the

Frente complained about the recruitment of batistianos, the
reply was:

"They're anti-communists, aren't they?"-^

^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 235.
-^Tad Szulc, "Cuba:
July 18, 1961, p. 76.

Anatomy of a Failure, Look,

"Cuban Drama," New York Times, April 23, 1961,
p. 11.

28
When the right-wing group took over, it used its
power to eliminate from command all those who held pro
gressive or liberal views.

The foremost target was Manuel
/
Ray's MRP, and during the months preceding the invasion
this organization was deprived of any assistance, even
though it operated the most successful underground net
work in Cuba.

While explosives, weapons, and military

supplies flowed to other groups that were not objectional
to the CIA's field operators, the MRP had to plead, bar
gain, and fight for every pound of explosives and supplies
it needed.

So in the critical weeks preceding the inva

sion, the principal underground organization in Cuba was
ignored by the very people planning the assault. 37
Washington kept getting reports about the splendid
morale in the training camps, even though discontent was
increasing--a discontent that broke out in insurrection in
the Guatemalan camps.

The CIA operatives were forced to

arrest a number of the ringleaders and threaten to scuttle
38
the whole program before it was able to regain control.
In the meantime CIA planners had chosen Trinidad, a
city of twenty thousand on the southeast coast of Cuba as
the point of invasion.

It was chosen because it was far

from Castro's main army, it had a good harbor and beach
head, but--most important--it was close to the Escambray
3^Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, pp. 92-96,
passim.

38ibid.
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Mountains.

If the venture failed, the invaders had a place

to which they could escape.

The plan now was for an am

phibious assault supported by paratroopers, while the rebel
/
air squadron bombed Cuban airfields to destroy Castro's Air
Force.
The plan, as related by Stewart J. Alsop, also called
for a revolutionary council of civilian Cubans, to be flown
in to set up a provisional government at the town of Giron,
who would, if the invaders could sustain themselves for a
period of "ten days to two weeks, call for recognition and
military assistance."^

Legitimacy would have the value of

making it possible for the United States to send supplies
to the government which it recognized. This rebel govern/ , #
ment was to be headed by Jose Miro Cardona.
On January 22, 1961, two days after the inauguration
of John F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, speaking for the CIA, and
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
exposed the project to the leading members of the new ad
ministration.

After listening to this briefing, Kennedy

instructed the Defense Department to make a complete study
of the military plan, and instructed the State Department
to work through the OAS on a program to isolate and contain
Cuba.

On February 3> General Lemnitzer and Admiral Arleigh

^Szulc, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Failure," Look,
July 18, 1961, pp. 76-78.
^Stewart J. Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster,"
Readers Digest, September 1961, p p . i|_30—lp31 *
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Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, endorsed the Trinidad
plan and on the basis of information available to them,
ill
predicted success.
/
Meetings, conferences, and briefings on the Cuban
situation continued.

Perhaps the most important was the

one held on the fourth of April in the State Department
with the following present:

Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, Senator William J. Pulbright of
Arkansas,

(chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com

mittee), General Lemnitzer, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and
presidential advisors and specialists.^
After a great deal of discussion, Kennedy voiced
opposition to the Trinidad plan as being "too spectacular."
He wanted a "quiet landing in a more obscure place, pre
ferably at night."

He insisted also that no American

forces were to be used, stressing the probability of antiAmerican reactions in Latin America and the United Nations.
Kennedy was "especially concerned that the air strikes
would seem plausibly to come from Cuban soil."^3

After

a reevaluation of landing sites, the Bay of Pigs was
chosen.

The change had some advantage in that there would

be less likelihood of harming civilians at the Bay of Pigs
^ R o s s and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. ipl.
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 238.
^Ibid.
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because hardly anyone lived there.

It was also thought

that the landing would have the appearance of an effort
to resupply guerrillas .kk/
Karl Meyer reported that "the one dissenting voice
at this pivotal meeting was that of Senator Fulbright, who
felt that the venture would be a violation of the spirit and
possibly the letter of United States laws, as well as trea
ties which this country had signed.^-5

Schlesinger, who was

present, insisted that "although the Senator may have had
reservations he did not, as has been written, oppose the
invasion at this time. "^-6
On Wednesday afternoon, April 12, at the President's
weekly news conference the first question asked was about
the invasion plans for Cuba.

The President in his reply

ruled out "under any condition an intervention in Cuba by
the United States Armed Forces. "^-7

"The basic issue in

Cuba," the President said, "is not one between the United
States and Cuba, it is between the Cubans themselves.

I

intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and as I
understand it, this administration's attitude is so

^ R o s s and Wise, The Invisibile Government, p. 1+6.
^ K a r l Meyer, Fulbright of Arkansas (Washington D.C.:
Robert B. Luce, Inc. ~ 1963) , P~- 193.
See also Helen Fuller,
Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p . 57
^ S c h l e singer, A Thousand Days, p. 2l+0.
^4-7"Ho w Kennedy Upset Invasion," United States News
& World Report, February 1+, 1963, p. 29.
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understood and shared by anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in
this country."^®

In so saying the President had tied his

hands--if the invasion failed there would be no help com/
ing from the United States.

Ironically, members of the

American armed forces did participate, and as will be later
revealed, the plans called for a full scale invasion by
American forces if the exiles could hold a beachhead until
a temporary government could be established.
The Cuban brigade in Guatemala now numbered li|00 men,
of these only about 135 were former soldiers.
2I4.O students made up the largest single group.

Of the rest
Also in

cluded were, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, landowners and
their sons, fishermen and peasants.
twenty nine.

The average age was

Many of them were new recruits and had been

at the base only a few days--some had not even fired a gun.
Meyer and Szulc reported "their spirits were high, and all
were waiting impatiently for the target date which had been
set at April 17, 1 9 6 1 . " ^

Many factors, enumerated later,

determined the choice of invasion date.
The brigade was moved to the point of embarkation and
on April 13, they began loading on boats.

The CIA had

leased three old and worn-out commercial vessels from the
Garcia Lines for two months, and had also purchased two
^•®"In Cuban Invasion:
The Fatal Mistakes," United
States News & World Report, May 29, 1961, p. 76; Fuller,
Year of Trial~| p3 59.
^ M e y e r and Szulc, "The Cuban Invasion," New Repub
lic, May 21, 1962, p. 230.
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LCIs.

On April II4. the invasion plan was revealed to the

troops.

The brigades mission was to take and hold two

beaches, Playa Giron and Plava Larga, for three days, after
/
which, they were told, "they could put their hands out,
turn left and go straight into Havana."^0
Neutralization of Castro's air force was to take
place before the invasion by air strikes from Nicaraguan
bases. 5>1 ' These were now under debate--the State Depart
ment was afraid that pre-invasion strikes would show the
American hand, but the Pentagon insisted that they were
essential in order to protect the disembarkation.

A com

promise provided that a strike would be made against Cuban
airfields two days before the invasion by Cuban pilots
pretending to be defectors from Castro's air force.

U-2

flights would then assess the damages, and a second strike
would be made the morning of the invasion. 32
Havana was awakened early Saturday morning April 1$,
by the roar of aircraft and bomb explosions.

Looking up

it saw two B-26 bombers with the insignia of Castro's
Revolutionary Air Force making dive passes at the Camp
Libertad airfield on the outskirts of the city.

A little

earlier the bombers had strafed the big air force base at
^°Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 83 .
York:

^ M . Stanton Evans, The Politics of Surrender (New
Devan-Adair Company" 1966). p . 3&3•
92
^
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 270.

3k
San Antonio de Los Banos, and a third group did the same
a little later at the Santiago air field in the province
of Oriente.^
The pilots returned to Nicaragua and the United
States with optimistic reports of widespread damage, but
the overflights the next day showed only five aircraft de
finitely destroyed.

Not all attacking planes made it back

--one made an emergency landing at Key West.-^

In the

meantime, according to Time, "one B-26 had flown straight
from Nicaragua to Miami to put the cover plan into oper
ation.

The pilot on landing announced himself as a Castro

defector who had just bombed the airfields.

The unsched

uled arrival of the second plane at Key West complicated
things s o m e w h a t . T h e

Revolutionary Council sitting in

New York issued a communique announcing that "the B-26s
had been flown out of Cuba by defecting Castro airmen who
decided to inflict a little damage before escaping the is
land.

The deceit was rather flimsy, for although the

CIA had taken pains to disguise the B-26s with Castro
^"Massacre:
1961, p. 18.

Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28,

^ R O S S and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. Iql.
Nine B-26s had left Nicaragua. One was shot down, and
three had landed, respectively, at Key West, Grand Cay
man and Miami. Two pilots were dead. But five of the
bombers returned to Happy Valley, Nicaragua.
^ Time, April 28, 1961, p. 18.
^ M e y e r and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 120.
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markings, they had overlooked the fact that Castro's
B-26s were equipped with plexiglass noses, while the air
craft used by the rebel pilots were models with opaque
/
noses.

The rocket mounts were corroded and the guns were

uncocked and had not been fired.^7
Kennedy, who had great concern for the United Nations
aspect of the Cuban operation, had said to a group at a
briefing in the cabinet room that he wanted Adlai Stevenson,
United Nations representative, to be fully informed, and
that nothing that was said at the United Nations should be
anything but the truth.

"The integrity and credibility of

Stevenson," Kennedy had remarked, "constitute one of our
great national assets.

I don't want anything to be done

which might jeopardize that."58
Raul Roa, Castro's United Nations delegate, de
nounced the vandalistic "aggression carried out at dawn,"
and placed responsibility for the attack on the government
of the United States. ^
began his reply.

When Roa finished, Adlai Stevenson

Haynes Johnson said:

"It was to be the

most humiliating moment in his distinguished career.

Twice

a candidate for the presidency, urbane and eloquent, a man
whose reputation for statesmanship and integrity was
57"gitter Week: The Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28,
1961, p. 18. Planes used by rebels were old relics secured
by CIA redeemed from United States Air Force graveyards.
58schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 271.
59"iji0ward D-Day," Time, April 21, 1961, p. 32.
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unquestioned, was now trapped by a tangle of lies.”60
There appears to be some controversy over how much Steven
son had been told.

Victor Lasky, in --------------J.F.K., --------------------------The Man and /

the Myth, says that President Kennedy never discussed the
proposed Cuban invasion with either Stevenson or Chester
Bowles, who had been his chief advisors on foreign affairs
during his campaign.

This was especially strange in the

case of Stevenson because he was the man in the administra
tion most informed on Latin American affairs.6l

Ross and

Wise disagree, saying that a couple of days before the
April 15 raid, Tracy Barnes, the CIA man assigned as liai
son with the State Department, came to see Stevenson in New
York and briefed him on the Bay of Pigs operation.

He in

dicated vaguely that the United States would not be in
volved.

But as he told about the Cuban exiles, his story

was so ambiguous, Stevenson became convinced that the
United States was involved.62
The last "no-go” point had been reached and the
President had given his consent for the expedition to pro
ceed.

In the meantime the CIA cover story was beginning

to crack--it was evident that Stevenson had misinformed
the United Nations.

Readers Digest reported:

"Rusk,

60Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 92.

York:

6lvictor Lasky, J.F.K., The Man and the Myth (New
The Macmillan Company, 1963), p . 520.

62r o s s and wise, The Invisible Government, p. 16.
See also Fuller, Year of Trial, p. 57 •
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remorseful at the position into which the State Department
had thrust its United Nations ambassador, now resolved that
the Cuban adventure should not be permitted further to

I
jeopardize the larger interest of the United States foreign

policy."^3
A description of the scene aboard the invasion fleet
is told by men who participated.

Haynes Johnson inter

viewed these men as they returned from Cuban prison camps.
"The men lounged, listening to the radio, talking, trying
not to appear nervous.
afraid."

Everyone was afraid of acting

At sunset, as the ships neared the southern coast

of Cuba, the men were called together on deck.
luted as the Cuban flag was raised.

They sa

By 7:^5 o'clock the

five principal ships and their two United States Navy es
cort vessels had reached the rendezvous point, where they
were joined by landing craft carrying the tanks and heavy
equipment.

"The men began singing the Cuban National hymn

as the convoy began moving up the coast toward the Bay of
Pigs."6^
With the coming of the night a clandestine radio
transmitter operated by the CIA on Swan Island began send
ing this message into the Caribbean sky:
Look well at the rainbow.
Chico is in the house.

"Alert I Alert'.

The first will rise very soon.

Visit him.

The sky is blue.

^ Readers Digest, September 19614., p. 256.
^Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, pp. 9I4.-95.
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notice in the tree.
ters are white.

The tree is green and brown.

The let

The fish will not take much time to rise.

The fish is red.

Look well at the rainbow.

..."

It was

' 63
the message for the Cuban underground to rise.
Schlesinger gives the following account of the
battle:
At 2 a.m., frogmen slid into the water from
speedboats, and swam to the two beaches to in
stall position lights and destroy any obstacles
to the landing. Two battalions from the brigade
went ashore at Playa Giron and one battalion at
Playa Larga, while another was sent to the north
to secure the air strip. Difficulty was encoun
tered on the coral reefs that had been ignored
or forgotten in the briefing, but the invaders
encountered little initial resistance as they
waded ashore. At daybreak paratroops had/been
dropped inland to secure interior points.
Castro's air force, alerted by the first clash,
roared into the sky at daybreak with orders to concentrate
on rebel shipping.

At nine-thirty in the morning a Sea

Fury sank the ship carrying all the amunition reserve for
the next ten days and most of the communications equipment.
Newsweek described the loss "as an inexplicable concentra
tion of treasure in a single hull ." ^
65Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 125;
Ross and Wise, in The Invisible Government,- p. Ip3, said that
the radio message was taken from a code used by persecuted
Christians in the Roman era in which they would draw a fish
to indicate a clandestine meeting was to be held. The CIA
had selected this as a symbol for the invasion.
(Hence the
business about fish rising, which Radio Swan had broadcast
Sunday night.)
A Thousand Days, p. 273*
The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961
p. 2ip.
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In the lull following the first attack, C —i_|_6 trans
ports carrying the brigade paratroopers flew over the beach
on their way inland.

One of the fliers later told Haynes

Johnson that, "one of the planes dipped low to salute the
invaders, and as it did, the men on the ground opened
fire."

Bullets passed through the fuselage.

hell's going on?" one paratrooper yelled.
crazy.

"What the

"They've gone

„68
On the Houston the greenest battalion was left.

They were reluctant to get off.
shouted in anger:

The American commander

"It's your war you bastards.

Get off!"

As they got off and headed for the beach, they heard be
hind them the motors of an airplane.
one of theirs.

They thought it was

The plane attacked them and as it came

around for the second pass the commander shouted, "every
body fire at the God damn thing."

This time they hit, and
69
when it made a third pass it went down in flames.
The fighting went on through a hot, clear day, the
invaders digging in behind their tanks, bazookas and mor
tars, but by early Tuesday it was clear that the invasion
was in trouble.

Trouble was brewing in other spots of the

world also.^9
Kruschev sent an angry note to Washington denouncing
the invasion, saying:

"As to the Soviet Union there should*
6
9

/Q
Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 112.
69Ibid.
7°Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 275-

be no misunderstanding our position.

We shall render the

Cuban people and their government all necessary assistance
in beating back the armed attack on Cuba."
noon Kennedy sent his reply:

In the after

"I have previously stated,

and I repeat now, that the United States intends no mili
tary intervention in Cuba.

In the event of any military

intervention by outside forces we will immediately honour
our obligations under the inter-American system to protect
this hemisphere against external aggression." 71
That evening the President called another meeting of
his staff to discuss what could be done to relieve the sit
uation on the beaches of Cuba.

The navy wanted to use an

air strike against Castro from the carrier Essex lying off
Cuba, supposedly on navy maneuvers.
"We are involved sir.

Admiral Burke said:

We trained and armed these Cubans.

We helped land them on the beaches, God dammit, Mr. Presi
dent, we can't let those boys be slaughtered there.”

The

President finally consented to allow six unmarked jets from
the Essex to fly the mission over the Bay of Pigs for the
hour before dawn Wednesday morning.

Their mission would be

to cover a B-26 attack from Nicaragua, but they were not to
72
seek air combat.
The groups started out that night but
through one more mixup in this doomed affair the B-26s
^ D . Lawrence, "Let's Invade Cuba," United States
News & World Report, November 6, 1961, p. Il6.
^ Readers Digest, September 196[|_, p. 263. A later
account said this was the carrier Boxer--not the Essex.
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arrived over the beachhead an hour ahead of jet support.
The result was disastrous.
By Wednesday fighting on the beaches was over.

A
/

reporter for Readers Digest wrote:

"For three days men

had fought without rest and little food and water.
to a man they were captured or killed.
sea on rafts but few of these survived."

Almost

A few put out to
Shortly after 5

p.m. Wednesday the Free Cuban beach commander sent a final
message:

"I am destroying all my equipment.

ing left to fight with.
my position.

I have noth

The enemy tanks are already in

Farewell, friends."73

Meyer and Szulc summarized:

"At the moment of defeat

there were no answers--only questions."

At noon on Thurs

day President Kennedy appeared before the American Society
of Newspaper Editors to discuss the recent events in Cuba.
The President was composed and impressive, but the strain
had taken its toll.

The belligerant tone was that of a

thwarted leader searching for release from a sense of
defeat, as he said:
. . . let the record show that our restraint
is not inexhaustible.
If the nations of this
hemisphere should fail to meet their committments
against outside communist penetration then this
government will not hesitate in meeting its pri
mary obligations which are the security of our
nation.
Should that time ever come, we do not
intend to be lectured on intervention by those
whose character was stamped for all time on the
bloody streets of Budapest.7l+
.i
73ibid., p. 267.
7^+Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. Iip2,
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CHAPTER I I I

Reaction and Response
When the extent of the debacle became clear, the
American reaction came quickly.

President Kennedy was

fully prepared to shoulder the blame, but was not pre
pared for "I-told-him-so" reports that began to appear in
print.1

The New York Times reported that Secretary Dean

Rusk and under-Secretary Bowles had advised against the in
vasion.1
2* Kennedy called Rusk and "blisteringly" reminded
him that he had not offered such advice at the time.
Bowles was confronted by Robert F. Kennedy in a personal
confrontation, who jabbed his finger at him and said, "I
understand you advised against this operation.

Well let

me tell you something as of right now, you did not, you
were for it."

This was not true, however, for Bowles had

filed a report stating his opposition and presented it to
Rusk, but it never came to the attention of the President.3
When reports reached the President indicating that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated they were bypassed,
1 "Cuba:

The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961.

2Tad Szulc, "From Robin Hood to Revolutionary
Oracle," New York Times Magazine, July 16, 1961, p. lip.
^Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 28.
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Kennedy called McNamara and told him to "crack the whip."
Some members of the CIA were also trying to save face,
saying they had opposed the operation.

Dulles was call/

ed and told to "get the agents in line."^
pathized, stating:

Newsweek sym

"The President took the rap himself,

but the haunting, significant fact remained; somewhere
along the line, trusted men failed him."^
The press did not deal too unkindly with the Pres
ident.

In the opinion of the Nation, what amounted to a

fait accompli confronted Kennedy when he took office.

The

invasion plans had already been made, and he was given to
understand that they had been designed by his predecessor
/
--a man of awesome military reputation.
According to the
New Republic the situation inherited by the Kennedy admin
istration "had its own dynamics, and like a boulder roll
ing downhill the process gathered its own momentum and
became constantly harder to stop."^

So it was not a mat

ter of inaugurating a new process, but whether to stop an
existing one.

The new administration would encounter much

more domestic criticism for stopping an anti-Castro move
ment already underway than for simply launching one.*
&
^-Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York:
& Row, 1965) » p. 29)+.

Harper

^Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 28.
^F. J. Cook, "CIA--The Case Builds Up," Nation,
June 22, 1961^, p. 6l6 .
^Louis J. Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder,"
New Republic, June 5 3 1961, p. 13.

Victor Lasky, author of J. F . K., The Man and the
Myth, takes issue with the argument that Kennedy had no al
ternative but to approve the Cuban plans inaugurated by his
predecessor.

During the later stages of the I960 campaign,

Kennedy had taunted the Eisenhower administration for al
lowing a communist regime to exist less than ninety miles
from the coast of the United States.

In his campaign prom

ises he had called for what amounted to a direct interven
tion in Cuba.

He said:

"We must attempt to strengthen the

non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in
Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing
Castro.
After our country’s humiliation in the Bay of Pigs,
Eisenhower, in keeping with a lifelong practice of support
ing the nation's commander in chief in times of crises,
called upon the American people to stand by President Ken
nedy.

He said vehemently that the last thing they should

want was an immediate public airing of the Cuban fiasco,
likening such demands to "witch-hunting."^
When Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Theodore C. Soren
son, ranking members of Kennedy's staff, wrote their intim
ate histories of the Kennedy administration they attempted9
^Victor Lasky, J. F. K., The Man and the Myth (New
York:
Devan-Adair, 1965) ? p"! 516.
See also Hugh Sidey,
John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum, 1963),
P. 14-3.
9
U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks of
Hon. John W. Wydler, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., A5)+35*

to link the Eisenhower administration with the Cuban in
vasion and sought also to discredit Eisenhower's appointed
military and intelligence experts.

The disputed material

is summed up for both in the following paragraph from the
Sorenson version:

"On January 20, 1961, John Kennedy in

herited the plan, the planners, and most troubling of all,
the Cuban's exile brigade. . . . Unlike an inherited pol
icy statement of Executive order, this inheritance would
not be simply disposed of by Presidential decision or
withdrawal."'1'^

The purpose of the statement was to exon

erate, but in reality it constituted a disservice to, the
late President Kennedy, who at no time sought to shift the
responsibility for any of his executive decisions.
It was at this point that Eisenhower in the interest
of historical accuracy decided to set the record straight
by giving the public the facts about these earlier events.
In an interview with Earl Mazo, he gave his account of the
situation as it existed when he left the White House.

Dur

ing the transition period between administrations he brief
ed Kennedy on all pending matters including the secret pro
gram inaugurated the year before to train and equip Cuban
refugees.

He stressed that no committments had been made

that might bind the new President.
10Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 295*

If Kennedy had wished
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the Cuban exile brigade was still so small and relatively
unprepared it could easily have been disbanded.11
In his book, The Wine is Bitter, Milton Eisenhower,
/
brother of the ex-President, maintains that Eisenhower did
not have any plan to sponsor an invasion of Cuba.

However,

recognizing that there might come a day when the pressure
from refugees would increase and the situation dictate some
action, approval was given the CIA to organize and give
.
IP
military training to Cuban exile groups.
Power, Emmet John Hughes states:

In Ordeal of

"It is hardly conceiv

able that an Eisenhower could have presided over so abor
tive a military action as the half-invasion of Cuba in
April of 1961."13
Of the nonpolitical experts retained by Kennedy, not
ably Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, and the military Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower said:

"These men over decades

of devoted service have shown their capabilities, their
sense of logic, their understanding of the problems in
volved in this kind of venture.

There is no more expert

group in their profession than these men. . . . Nothing
that has been said by Kennedy and others after the Bay of
Hu.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks
of Hon. John W. Wydler, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., A5^35»
^Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (New York:
Doubleday, 1963), p. 269.
13Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York:
Atheneum, 1963), p. 356.
See also U.S., Congressional
Record, Joseph Clark, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 10337*
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Pigs debacle has shaken my faith in these men."
lieved:

i

He be

"The very disparagement of these seasoned pro

fessionals showed how unqualified the presidential advisors
were to deal with the sort of problem involved in a crit
ical international venture like the Bay of Pigs."-^

Hugh

Sidey described them as brave men from a brave era when the
United States had no peer as a military power--the ribbons
on their chests marked their years of success.^
When Kennedy directed the joint chiefs to review the
plans and combat readiness of the proposed venture to de
termine its chance of success, they reported that the op
eration was "marginal" but did have a good chance of topling Castro.^

Tully maintains that they made the en

dorsement on two conditions--that CIA was correct in its
appraisal of the political situation and that the rebels
would control the air over the beachhead. 17' United States
News & World Report pointed out that military men are ac
customed to make careful detailed studies, but these could
not be made because the plans for invading Cuba were so
■^U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,

A5435.
19
^Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy (New York:
1963), p. 125.

Atheneum,

^ Newsweek, May 1, 1961, p. 2l|_.
^ A n d r e w Tully, CIA:
Morrow, 1962), p. 25.

The Inside Story (New York:

secret that even the joint chiefs were not given adequate
information.-*-®

The judgments made were not based on obser

vation but upon information given by the CIA.

It was also^

made clear that the plans as approved by the joint chiefs
went through many changes before the invasion occured.
All who participated will have to share the respon
sibility for the failure, but the agency most directly im
plicated was the CIA.

Not only did it procure the arms

and train the invaders, it was CIA's intelligence estimates
upon which the other agencies made their plans and deci
sions.

Time quoted the Raleigh (North Carolina) News and

Observer saying:

"Americans would be safer if the CIA

Chief Allen Dulles were allowed to depart, taking his
frayed cloak and blunt dagger with him into private life."
The Time added that even Eleanor Roosevelt suggested
mildly that the CIA was not very well informed.-1-^
reporters wrote:

Life

"The invasion had been prematurely timed,

inadequately mounted, strategically doomed, and based on
woefully inept intelligence or wildly wishful thinking or
both.

The responsibility lay upon the agencies of the

United States--the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
l®"In Cuban Invasion: The Fatal Mistakes," United
States News <Sc World Report, February Ip, 1963.
19"inquest:
Cuban Invasion Fiasco," Time, May 5*
1961, p p . 58-9. For a detailed discussion see Norman
Cousins, "The Cuba Incident and the Rule of Law, Saturday
Review, May 13, 1961, p. 27.
20"Bitter Fruits of Defeat: Worldwide Jeers and
Tears," Life, April 28, 1961, p. 22.

Much of the criticism involved the failure to use
the forces inside Cuba.

There was already available in

the Escambray mountains an effective guerrilla band.

This

"ready to fight" anti-Castro force needed only food and
weapons to be effective.

But adequate help never came. PI

The group was further weakened by a Castro "round-up"
early in 1961, in which many were taken into custody along
with tons of American-made munitions.

Javier Felipe Pasoz

Vea, a Cuban who had been with Castro in Sierra Maestra,
had tried to convince the planners that military interven
tion would be a disaster.

He said:

"The overthrow of com

munism by internal revolutionary forces is a far better solution for the West and for the Cubans." 22

The New Repub

lic was certain the vital missing part was the lack of
participation by the Cuban people in whose name the inva
sion was being fought.^3
When Eisenhower first directed the CIA to organize
the exiles, batistianos were specifically excluded.

These

were the adherents of the ousted dictator Batista, dedi
cated to restoring the order that had existed under him
with all of its inequities of absentee landlords and impov
erished peasantry.
21"Cuba:

Tully relates that President Kennedy

Anatomy of a Failure," Look, July l8, 1961,

p. 78.
PP

"Cuba: Long Live the Revolution," New Republic,
November 3, 1962, p p . l£-l6.
23"QUban Invasion," New Republic, May 21, 1962, p.
23.
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also issued an order excluding them from the Liberation
Army, but the CIA refused to put the ban into effect.

Im

portant Batista officers, including the San Roman brothers,
)
were given important commands because, as CIA explained,
they were proven anti-communists .2^4-

Castro himself had

said in an interview with Henri-Brasson, French journal
ist who was commissioned by L ife to do an on-the-spot
story in March 1963? that the invasion was doomed from the
start because the brigade was composed of batistianos.^
Meyer and Szulc wrote that many agents measured re
liability by the loudness with which they denounced Castro
and communism.

To the CIA, former Batista officers were

simply anti-communists who were zealous in opposing the
rascal who humiliated their army.

To many Cubans there was

no distinction between "good" and "bad" Batista officers-PA
they were all bad. ° The New Leader pointed out that there
were available many former members of the rebel army among
the exiles but most of them would not fight alongside
former members of Batista's army or police, and certainly
would not serve under them.^?
It was not only the batistianos that were favored.
2^-Tully, CIA:

The Inside Story, p. 2l|_9.

25h enri Cartier-Brasson, "Castro's Cuba Seen Face
to Face," Life, March 1$, 1963? p. 30.
26]y[eyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 106.
^Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," New
Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 6.

51
The New Republic reported that the United States was back
ing, as the invasion boss and successor to Castro, the re
latively unknown Manuel Artime Buesa, a one-time Castro
/
soldier who had served briefly as an official in an agrar
ian reform zone in Oriente.

His military experience was

inconsequential, but he was an accomplished orator.

His

support lay with the more conservative sections of the Rev
olutionary Council, but commanded little influence in Cuba.
The CIA, while promoting the more conservative group,
pushed aside the better-established opposition of Manuel
Ray who had the best-established underground organization
in Cuba.28

Tully asserts that:

Ray had built up this organization of saboteurs
during a precarious eight-month stay in Cuba
after he broke with Castro, and it was a model
of its kind. The network spanned the entire
island with a seven-man executive council in
each province and lesser commands reaching down
to the smallest village.
Ray became the target of reactionary exile Cuban business
men and politicians.

The word was passed that Ray was a

dangerous leftist who would continue a communist economy
in Cuba, eliminating only Castro.29
The CIA fieldmen failed to see or chose to ignore the
fact that the left-of-center groups were attracting most of
the dissident support in Cuba itself.

These more liberal

groups were representative of Castro’s 26th of July

28"What Went Wrong," New Republic, May 1, 1961,
P. 11+.
29Tully, CIA:

The Inside Story, p. 214-5*
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movement who had taken his program of democratic social
reform seriously, and defected only when they came to be
lieve that he was heading toward a form of communist totalitarianism.30

Among these were a group of top guer

rilla fighters, defecting captains from Castro's rebel
army, several of whom had previously attended United States
jungle warfare school in Panama.

They were now idle and

desired to enlist in the Cuban Brigade but were ignored by
CIA.31

Castro said these people were disillusioned be

cause they were not appointed to the high positions they
thought they deserved or they did not receive an expected
portion of the property taken from foreign investors.

Dis

sent was certain these were the people that should have
been used in Castro's overthrow.

It said:

"It was crimin

ally stupid to work once again with discredited right wing
forces, with men whose committment to social reform (or to
democratic government) was dubious to say the least."32
When the deep divisions among the troops that were
being trained became apparent, the Frente was disbanded and
the Cuban Revolutionary Council was formed.

This in

cluded such men as Miro Cardona, Castro's first premier
30"The Invasion that Could not Succeed," Reporter,
May 11, 1961, p. 20; Draper, "Cuba and United States
Policy, New Leader, June 5* 1961, p. 7*
3lRichard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," New
Yorker, May 6, 1961, p. 139.
32Michael Walzer, "Cuba: The Invasion and the Con
sequences," Dissent, June 1961, p. L|_.
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and Manuel Ray, both of whom were far to the left of the
Frente politicians.

This did not stop the feuding.

When

Artime arbitrarily changed a number of commanders, there
i

was open rebellion.

Two hundred men refused to fight under

their new commander, Captain Robert San Roman, because he
had served as an officer under Batista.33

This group was

placed under arrest and isolated, under guard, from the
rest of the troops.

A few escaped and others eventually

rejoined their command but a hard core refused to give in.
These dissidents received rough treatment from the CIA.
They were flown to a remote jungle airstrip at Sayaxche,
in Peten province, and then taken upriver in canoes to what
was called a "reindoctrination camp."

It was actually a

prison from which they were not released until after the
Bay of Pigs invasion failure.3k
This unhappy condition reflected the entire invasion
plan.

If the CIA had availed itself early of a more lib

eral organization that had wider appeal among Cubans and
also controlled an effective anti-Castro underground, the
adventure would have had a better chance.

There is sound

military reason to believe that with full use of this un
derground the venture may have been successful.33
The original plan was to build up the underground
33h aynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 62.
3^-Tully, CIA:
35lbid., p .

The Inside Story, p. 2I4.7 .
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within Cuba through a long, slow period of guerrilla in
filtration by exiles trained in Guatemala.

Castro's

opponents, many of them ex-comrades from his guerrilla

,

days, urgently advised that only guerrilla warfare could
succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The efforts to help the

anti-Castro guerrillas, to supply them with needed equip
ment, and to assist them to establish firm bases failed.
The Escambray commanders were intensely suspicious of the
ultimate aims of the divergent exile groups and were re
luctant to swear allegiance to them.36

Charles W. Thayer

in his book Guerrilla, suggests that American military ad
visors opposed guerrilla type operations because to them,
"the guerrilla's foraging and grubbing for food seemed
primitive compared to the intricate system of logistics
they had learned."

The primitive weapons of guerrilla

fighting, such as knives, spears, shotguns, and hand-made
bombs, "have none of the allure of the expensive hardware
of the modern arsenal."

They regarded guerrilla warfare

as something second rate and degrading for professional
officers.

Even though the American military was not to

have an active part in the Castro overthrow, their in
fluence was felt by the sponsors of the Cuban operation.
Thayer goes on to say that it was doubtful whether a move
ment based on democratic organization and dedicated to
legality can ever be "ruthless and cruel enough to impose

^Editorial, New York Times, April 22, 1961, p. 2i^_.
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the brutal discipline a modern guerrilla force demands.
By far the most effective and co-ordinated under
ground network in the country, particularly in Havana and
other urban areas, was the MRPs led by Manuel Ray, the man
the CIA had pushed aside.

The Reporter was certain he was

the one man whose efforts could have been most effective
in setting off internal rebellion.

The entire operation

was based on the assumption of a popular uprising against
Castro as soon as the landing materialized.

The Cuban ex

ile force was to be the catalyst, a core of trained fight
ers, around which discontented Cubans would rally.
Fortune’s description of what was to take place included
a barrage of radio broadcasts from a nearby
island and showers of pamphlets from air
planes intended to galvanize the anti-Castro
Cubans in the cities and villages. Once the
beachhead was consolidated and fighting went
foreward, to link up with the guerrillas in
side Cuba, a mass revolt would be stimulated. ^
Manuel Ray’s underground was prepared to hit pre-selected
targets and also had available fourteen transmitters scat
tered across the country to appeal to the people.

But they

never went into action--they received no word in advance.*
&
37charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York:
& Row, 1963)j p. 19.

Harper

3®"The Invasion That Could Not Succeed”, Reporter,
May 11, 1961, p. 22. Thayer (see footnote above) said:
"The expectation of an uprising was so great, that along
with the first wave of invaders, I4.OOO extra rifles were
sent ashore to arm the newcomers."
^Charles V. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set
Straight," Fortune, September 1961, p. 97*
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The leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Council were given
no opportunity to co-ordinate with the Cuban underground.
They were held incommunicado by the CIA at an abandoned

/
airfield somewhere in Florida while the invasion was under

way.

Reporter William Shannon said:

"The co-ordinator of

the Cuban underground had a few days earlier journeyed
from the island to Miami in order to make plans; the inva
sion caught him 'flatfooted', and as a result, there was
no sabotage or uprising."^®

Look reported the underground

co-ordinator was fast asleep in Miami when news of the
ill
invasion earned
The CIA strategists knew of the Escambray mountain
fighters and other effective underground groups but had
little patience with them, saying that they were not suf
ficiently conscious of security.

A more likely reason for

their mistrust, however, may have been their lack of con
trol over them.

Right-wing conservatives also influenced

the elimination of the use of these more radical antiCastro organizations inside Cuba, destroying the very ma
chinery that may have brought about Castro's downfall.^
The invasion force was given first priority at the
expense of the anti-Castro forces inside Cuba.

It was a

^U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks
of Hon. William Fitts Ryan, quoting Mr. William Shannon
on Cuba, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., A2932.
^ T a d Szulc, "Cuba:
July 18, 1961, p. 91.

Anatomy of a Failure," Look,

^ M e y e r and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 8 7 . -
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crucial mistake to proceed, not knowing the strength of
the possible internal rebellion against Castro and what it
was capable of doing.

Not alerting these forces as to the
i

precise time of invasion discouraged them from taking ac
tion until they knew the nature and extent of what was tak
ing place.

They would not risk their lives until they had

some assurance the invasion could succeed.^

Monahan and

Gilmore quoted a Cuban guerrilla fighter as saying:
Despite setbacks, the underground was still
in fair shape.
I am positive that, given the
word, we could have carried out the major plan
of co-ordinated uprisings and sabotage. But
we were told nothing. We were left completely
in the dark.k-kKennedy came in for his share of the blame for the
lack of response from the Cuban people.

Critics maintained

that by repeatedly proclaiming that America would not under
any circumstances become involved in the action against
Cuba, he demoralized the population supposedly being re
lied on to revolt against the "oppressors."

On the advice

of Rusk, Stevenson, and Bowles, even the arrangements for
arousing the Cuban populace with leaflets, cards, and
radio broadcasts was deleted from the plan.

The fear be

ing that this was too obvious a showing of United States
^Draper, "Cuba and United States Policy," New Leader,
June 5> 1961, p. 27.
MlJames Monahan and Kenneth Gilmore, The Great
Deception (New York: Farrar Strauss, 1963), p. 11.
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hand.^

Lasky states:

"It was all good propaganda for

world consumption . . . but the effect was to serve notice
on Cubans in Cuba, who were waiting for an encouraging

/
signal from the United States, that if they rose up against

Castro tyranny, it would be at their own risk. "^-8
After the invasion failed and the CIA was accused of
making a faulty prediction that there would be an uprising,
Dulles responded that he knew of no estimate that a sponta
neous uprising would be touched off by the landing.^

Drew

Pearson said the invader’s strategy was "to hold out in the
swamp and on the beach."

There would be enough uprisings

across the country so the beachhead could be held and con
solidated until the rebels could establish a government on
Cuban s o il.^

The Cuban Revolutionary Council was to be

flown in, from the Opa-Locka, Florida airfield where they
were held in readiness, to proclaim itself the new govern
ment of Cuba.

Meyer and Szulc state:

"The assumption was

that the invaders could hold the Bay of Pigs long enough
to establish a provisional government--and . . .

it could

appeal to the outside world for help and the United States
^Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune,
September 1961, p. 227.
^Lasky,
York:

J. F. K . , The Man and the Myth, p. 519

^ A l l e n W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New
Harper & Row, 1963), p . 31•

^ R o bert E. Light and Carl Marzani, Cuba versus CIA
(New York: Marzani Munsell, Inc., 1961), p7 51•
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would be in a position to respond. "^-9

Joe Alex Morris, Jr.

reported in the Miami Herald Tribune;
The United States Navy was reported to have
two task forces, each with a carrier operating in the Caribbean area, instead of the
usual one. Both were said to be engaged in
routine exercises, as were 1,700 marines in
Puerto Rico. . . . American Naval and Air Force
units in the area were on a constant alert.50

'

The exercises were cancelled after the invasion failure.
Only naivete could misread United States aspirations and
intentions.

Walter Lippman in a critical analysis, wrote:

"No plans seem to have been made, no thought seems to have
been given, to what we would do then, what the rest of
Latin America would do then, what the Soviet Union would
do while the civil war was being fought."51
Shortly after the Revolutionary Council was formed on
March 22, 1961, it released its "minimum program."

Ironic

ally it had to be cautioned against placing too much
stress on the restoration of American property taken by
Castro.

In the opinion of Meyer and Szulc, their pledges

seemed to be addressed more to an American than a Cuban
audience.

The Council declaration was:

"We emphatically

assure those who have been unjustly dispossessed that all
their assets shall be returned."

Manuel Varona, president

^ M e y e r and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. II4.O;
Haynes Johnson, Bay of Pigs, p. 121; Schlesinger, A
Thousand Days, p7 27k•
5C>Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 50.
5lwalter Lippman, Washington Post, May 2, 1961, p. Ip.
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of the Council, went so far as to say:

"The need for

agrarian reform in Cuba is a my t h . " ^
The New Yorker questioned whether the Cuban masses,
would have revolted even if properly alerted.

They may

have been "so pleased with their lot under Castro that
they would not have welcomed a successor government of any
sort.Interestingly,

Senator-elect Claiborne Pell, Dem

ocrat of Rhode Island, after a visit to Castro's Cuba in
December, I960 said:

"The people of Cuba that I saw and

spoke to were not sullen or unhappy or dissatisfied."
About the same time, two other expert observers of
fered similar findings.

They were General Hugh B. Hester,

a veteran of the Southwest Pacific campaign in World War II,
and Jesse Gordon, a public relations consultant.

They found

that 86 per cent of the people supported Castro and that if
elections were held, Castro would be overwhelmingly returned
to power.

They concluded that if the United States military

high command proceeded with its plan to invade Cuba, the
result would be disastrous.^

Dissent declared:

"It was

criminally stupid to attempt to plunge Cuba into a civil*
6
^ M e y e r and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion, p. 107 •
^Rovere, "Letters from Washington," New Yorker, May
6, 1961, p. 11+5.
^ N e w York Herald Tribune, April 20, 1961, p. 11.
^ H u g h B. Hester and Jesse Gordon, "A New Look at
Cuba--the Challenge of Kennedy," New York Review, April
12, 1961, p. 63-

61
war in the absence of clear signs of internal revolt.
Animosity toward Americans had deep historical roots
on the island.

This anti-American feeling was especially

strong among many liberal and propertyless Cubans.

An in

vasion, no matter how it was disguised by Americans, looked
to many Cubans--and to the rest of the world--as a revival
of past landings of United States marines.
summarized:

The New Yorker

"There was practically no one who believed

that any undertaking of this sort would have been either
morally defensible or politically wise or 'paramilitarily'
feasable if it failed to obtain the support of the people
whose country was to be assaulted."57
On April 3? 1961, Kennedy ordered the State Depart
ment to publish a White Paper on Cuba.

It was a document

written largely by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., which appealed
to the Castro regime to "return to the original purposes
which brought so many gallant men together in the Sierra
Maestra and to restore the integrity of the Cuban Revolu
tion."^®

It was designed to prepare public opinion at home6

•^®Walzer, "Cuba: The Invasion and the Consequences,
Dissent, June 1961, p. Ip.
^Rovere, "Letters from Washington," New Yorker May
6, 1961, p. 139.
■^®Ibid., p. llpl; Draper, "Cuba and United States
Policy," New Leader, June 5? 1961, p. 92; Ross and Wise,
The Invisible Government, p. Ip1; M. Stanton Evans, The
Politics of Surrender [New York: Devan-Adair, 196677
p. 381.
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and abroad for the imminent clandestine invasion.

The

Monthly Review was very outspoken in its criticism, declar
ing it to be an attempt to justify its determination to
destroy the Cuban Revolution.

It raised this question:

t
"Is

it perhaps that the government never wanted Cuba to do more
than rest on the Constitution of 191+0, which contained no
threat to the profits and privileges of United States in
vestors in Cuba?

What colossal effrontery."^

On April 8, Federal immigration agents in Miami ar
rested Roland Masferrer, a notorious Batista henchman, who
had fled Cuba the same day as Batista.

He had been picked

up at the request of Dean Rusk who reported to Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy that his presence in this country
was prejudicial to our national interest from the point of
view of our foreign relations.

Two days later Masferrer was

indicted on charges of conspiring to outfit and send a mili
tary expedition against Cuba--a violation of our neutrality
laws.

Louis J. Halle suggests that:

"One possible reason

for Masferrer's arrest was that the administration believed
that charging him with invading Cuba would divert suspicion
from the government's own invasion plans, then in final
stages of preparation."00
The question of the morality and legality of the in
vasion resulted in much perturbation.

The New Republic

5°MonthIy Review, May 1961, p. 5*
0oHalle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New
Republic, June 5, 1961, p. 75>»
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said the action was a violation of our obligations under
American treaties not to interfere in the affairs of our
neighbors.

It was a violation of international law, the

United Nations charter, and the OAS charter, which states:
"No state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly
for any reason whatever in the internal affairs of any
z i -i

other state."

Arthur Larson, writing for the Saturday Re

view, puzzled over what had gone wrong in a country that
took pride in being the guardian of the law.

He said this

country can learn a useful lesson from the experience if it
realizes that it can not get rid of violence by emulating
6)2
violence or build a better world of law by flouting law.
The Monthly Review took a most extreme position, declaring:
The criminal nature and aims of the United States
must be exposed . . . the American ruling class
must be taught that the world will no longer toler
ate the re-imposition of imperial rule on a small
country that has heroically won its indepencence
and resolutely set its feet on the road to a bet
ter, happier future. ^
Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, debated in
wardly the morality of the act, the world response, the na
tional response, and the Latin-American reaction.
clusion was both unsound and misleading as he said:

His con
"Sup

port of the invasion, could be distinguished from uninvited
Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New Repub
lic , June 5) 1961, p. 756)2
"The Cuba Incident and the Rule of Law," Saturday
Review, May 13, 1961, p . 27.
^ Monthly Review, May 1961, p. 5*
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intervention" in the legal sense, because, "it was intended
to test the will of the Cuban people, not to topple their
government."

Walter Lippmann, ironically, said:

"It is
f

feasible, and in the practice of States it is not prohib
ited to give clandestine help to Castro's opponents . . .
so long as it remains clandestine."^
The question is often asked how President Kennedy and
his advisors had come to a decision to approve a venture so
greatly misconceived.
presidential election.

It goes back in part to the I960
Democratic candidate John Kennedy

was calling loud attention to the danger at our doorstep.
Clare Booth Luce quotes Kennedy as saying that Cuba was ev
idence that United States security and leadership were slip
ping away, and to "let Mr. Kruschev know that we are permiting no expansion of his foothold in our hemisphere.

The

New Republic said that the Kennedy administration thought
of itself as an administration of dynamic action.

This

kind of action against Cuba fitted the New Frontier--the
men in the inner ring dared not be anything but men of ac
tion.

So at the last dramatic meeting when the final deci

sion was being made and each man was asked in turn to voice
his opinion, it was difficult for any of them to disrupt
the consensus that was being formed.

This is the weakness

^ Helen Fuller, Year of Trial:
Kennedy's Crucial
Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1962), p. 58.
^ Clare Booth Luce, "Our Global Double Bind," Life,
October 5* 1962, p. 53*
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of bureaucracy--it is safer to be wrong with everyone else
LL
than to be right alone.00
One man who participated in the deliberations pleaded
/
with the President not to approve the plan. That was Sena
tor Fulbright of Arkansas.
when he stated:

He spoke with firm conviction

"This sort of oblique attack on another

Government is inherently immoral. . . . The wise course is
not to try to overthrow Castro, but to work constructively
elsewhere in Latin America."

In his opinion, if we were to

use armed force, we would have undone the work of thirty
years in trying to live down earlier interventions.

He

repeated a phrase Kennedy used during the campaign:

"The

road to freedom runs through Rio and Buenos Aires and
Mexico City."

He then added this statement:

"The Castro

regime is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger in
the heart."

1

In spite of his persuasion, Kennedy made

the most unfortunate decision of his career--a decision
for invasion.
There was another issue that was being questioned:
Was the plan as originally approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the administration militarily feasible?

Many of

k^Halle, "Lessons of the Cuban Blunder," New Republic.
June I4., 1961, p. 1L|_.
^Stewart Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster,"
Saturday Evening Post, June 2I4., 1961, p. 26; Puller, Year
of Trial:
Kennedy's Crucial Decisions, p. 57; Karl E.
Meyer, Fulbright of Arkansas (Washington D. C.: Robert B.
Luce, Inc., 1963), p . 196.
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the invaders insisted the plan was a masterful one.

If

it had been carried out as designed, it would have succeeded. 68

Fortune maintained that as a "tactical exercise,
f
it was well advised, daringly and successfully led, but

the strategists at the White House plucked it apart."

69

The plan that was put into operation was different from
the plan as visualized by Eisenhower in many requisite ways.
Stewart Alsop wrote:

"A peculiar, progressive watering
70
down process had occured."
The original idea was to feed the recruits back into
Cuba to reinforce the several thousand anti-Castro guer
rillas already established in the mountains.

Toward the

fall, however, a more ambitious and riskier project came
under consideration.

It was to be a "one-shot" invasion

to establish a beachhead for the expedition, to proclaim a
provisional government, and to provide a rallying point for
the discontented.
The first site selected for the landing was Trinidad.
If the beachhead could not be held, anti-Castro forces had
a "fail-back" position in the Escambray Mountains where the
anti-Castro guerrillas were already operating.

As Presi

dent Kennedy began subtracting from the elements necessary
Aft
DOMario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Readers
Digest, September 1961]., p. 263.
^Murphy, "Cuba:
September 1961, p. 92.

The Record Set Straight," Fortune,

^°Stewart Alsop, "Lessons of the Cuban Disaster"
Saturday Evening Post, June 2[|_, 1961, p. 26.
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to victory, the invasion site was switched from Trinidad
to the Bay of Pigs.
Colonel Ramon Barquin, Ray’s military leader, and
f

others protested in vain against this choice of landing
place.

Barquin was one of the most highly regarded mili

tary men among the exiles, and he knew Cuba as he knew his
right hand.

He pointed out that there were three narrow

roads and a railroad bed leading out of the swamp, all con
verging as they entered the central Cuban plain.

Castro

could concentrate his forces at this point and completely
annihilate the rebel forces.

Should any escape they could

never make their way to the Escambray's a hundred miles
away.^
The change may have had some advantage in that there
would be little danger of shooting civilians--hardly any
lived there.

It was also thought that the landing there

would be virtually unopposed and would appear to be an at
tempt to resupply guerrillas.^

This thought was appar

ently based on wishful thinking--it is doubtful that there
were guerrillas operating in this ares.

A more important

reason, however, was a political and foreign-policy concern
over possible world reaction.

Trinidad was too large a

city for such an undertaking to evade widespread notice*
7
^1Ibid.
72R o s s and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. Ip6.
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and avert the censure of world opinion. 7 3

This fear of

world opinion led to even more disastrous decisions.
Perhaps the most widely publicized criticism of the
/
Cuban operation was the manner in which the White House
handled the matter of air-strikes and air-cover.

One of

the essential elements of the plan was the use of air
power.

Castro's air force— consisting of four jet trainers,

six to eight B-26's and several British Sea Furies--was to
be destroyed on the ground in three air strikes by the Free
Cuban Squadrons based in Nicaragua.^

Two of these were to

take place before the invasion and the third was to coin
cide with the invasion.

Actually, the thought was that

not until after Castro's planes were shot down would the
landing forces hit the beaches.

Air strike number one was

to use all sixteen B-26 bombers in the rebel air squadron,
but the State Department argued that this was too many
planes to fit the pretense that the air strike was con
ducted by defecting Castro pilots, so the number was there
fore cut to eight.75
The first strike went off as planned, early Saturday
morning, April 15.

Its effectiveness was limited because it

had to appear as if it was done by Castro's own pilots.

No

73;gvans, The Politics of Surrender, p. 38I4..
7^4-Ross and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 20.
7^Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Readers Digest,
September 196J+, p. 2I4.6 ; Evans, The Politics of Surrender,
p. 381;.
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napalm was used, and the planes had to fly from Nicaragua
and return, leaving limited time for bomb runs.

It did

succeed, however, in giving rise to a great flurry in the
/
United Nations and elsewhere and as a result the United
States participation in the entire enterprise was coming
to the surface.^

As protests poured in, our image

conscious planners began to get panicky.

Stevenson, Rusk,

and Bowles advised the cancellation of the second air
strike.

They argued that additional attacks would make it

impossible to preserve the noninvolvement image of the
United States.77

in the opinion of many, the lack of this

air strike contributed most to the failure of the invasion.
Castro’s planes were free to wreak havoc among the invad
ers.

Everything now depended upon the success of the third

air strike, planned for the morning of the invasion.
Ross and Wise asked the question:

"Could the Presi

dent permit another B-26 air strike on Monday and still
convince the world that somehow a new covey of Castro pi
lots had defected from the Cuban Air P o rce?^
dent decided he could not.

The Presi

He therefore called off the

76Soren son, Kennedy, p. 301.
77pight and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 33; Evans,
The Politics of Surrender, p3 3^51 Sidey, John P. Kennedy,
p. 129.
7®"How President Kennedy Upset the Cuban Invasion,"
United States News & World Report, February if, 1963? p. 29.
79r q s s and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 20.

70
third air strike on which all hopes for the invasion de
pended.
This was a staggering blow to the CIA.

Bissell--

/

accompanied by Deputy Director Charles Cabell, an experi
enced airman--went immediately to urge Rusk to reconsider a
decision that, in its judgment, would put the enterprise in
irretrievable peril.

Rusk conferred with the President and
O

/''v

the answer was "no."ou

Bissell returned to his office and

flashed the word to Happy Valley, Nicaragua, where a small
force of B-26 s was sitting in readiness to take off for
the Bay of Pigs.

These were the planes of the invasion

force, flown by Cuban pilots.
O-i
use had been forbidden.

They did not take off--their

In the planning of the invasion an air strip was to
be set up on the invasion beach where rebel planes could
land and be refueled, so they could fly cover for the in
vasion.

Castro's air attacks prevented fuel from getting

ashore so the air strip could not be used.

This meant the

anti-Castro planes had to fly back 700 miles to Nicaragua
to refuel, which gave them only a few minutes over the
Q2
beach. The result was no air cover.
^Murphy, "Cuba:
The Record Set Straight," Fortune,
p. 93; Lasky, J. F. K . , The Man and the Myth, p. £21.
n
OJ"U.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks
of Hon. Charles b 7 Hoeven, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess., A^k-35*
82"ThQ Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World
Report, February Ip, 1963, p. 29.
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When the invasion began and Castro's jets not only
deciminated the Free Cuban Air Squadron but also sank two
freighters, Kennedy became alarmed.

In the face of impend/
ing, dismal failure, Bissell was told that the exile B-26s

could attack Castro's airfields at will.

A mission was

then planned to take place on Monday night--the pilots were
warned to avoid any risk to lives or civilian property.
The planes took off at 7:30 from Nicaragua and arrived over
the target four hours later on a moonless night, with both
the base and the nearby town blacked out and hidden by a
low cloud ceiling.

Not being able to distinguish their

target, the pilots obeyed orders, and the mission returned
without firing a shot or dropping a bomb.®^

United States

News & World Report said that removing the restrictions on
the invader's air force at this point "was like a surgical
operation to save a man who had already d i e d . " ^
Tuesday night, April 18, after a tortuous midnight
meeting at which Bissell made it plain that unless United
States air power was brought forward, the men on the beach
were doomed, the President authorized air cover from the
USS Boxer, for precisely one hour over the beaches.

This

would allow for the landing of supplies and for a strong
strike by the exile air force.

The plan collapsed when the

^"Lessons of the Cuban Disaster," Readers Digest,
September 1961, p p . 1|_3—74-8% " T h e Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World
Report, February 5? 1963? p. 20.
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exile B-26 s arrived over the beaches ahead of schedule-before the Boxer’s. jets had taken off.®^

The confusion

over time was not surprising, considering the frequency of
/
changes in the basic plan.

"When the Navy planes finally

got off their carrier," wrote Drew Pearson, "their only
contribution to freedom was to help Castro--they shot down
a rebel B-2 6."®^

Rebel planes had the same markings as

Castro's, except for some distinctive markings underneath,
and the Navy pilots not being able to see under the wing,
destroyed the rebel B-26.
The disputes following the invasion failure center
ing on the decisions made during these tragic hours rankled
Robert F. Kennedy.

He said that he was certain that "Pres

ident Kennedy never withdrew United States air cover--there
never were any plans made for United States air cover, so
there was nothing to w i t h d r a w . T h i s

statement stands in

contradiction to what the invasion forces had been led to
believe.

Verona said he went to the "Freedom Fighters"

training base in Guatemala and spoke to the American com
mander who stated:

"Don't worry, we will have complete

control of the air, and Castro won't be able to move a sin
gle car or truck any place in Cuba."

When asked if he was

^■^Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter, p. 270.
®^Drew Pearson, Grand Forks Herald, May 6 , 1961,
p. 1+.
87"The Air Will Be Ours," United States News & World
Report, February I4., 1963? p. 29.
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certain this was an American promise, he stated:

"The

promise came from an American placed there by the Ameri
can government.
him."

He had to have authority.
I believed in
/
Dagoberto Darias, commander of a transport ves

sel in the Cuban invasion, said he received an American
promise of air support.

"It came," he said, "in a radio

gram from the American flagship directing our opera
tions."88
/
/
s
On January 11, 1962, Jose Perez San Roman, commander
of the defeated brigade, made a trip to Washington to is
sue a statement from Attorney General Robert Kennedy's of
fice.

In the statement he flatly denied that the invasion

forces had ever been promised air support from the United
States Government.89

San Roman, nicknamed Pepe, was pro

bably the most important person participating in the inva
sion, and was certainly in a position to make known the
truth.

The following excerpts are from a transcription of

radio messages from the Bay of Pigs to the home base, where
Americans were in charge.

These messages signed by Pepe

San Rom^n contradict the statements made in the Attorney
General's office.
cover?

Pepe^.

"2AW to Air Command:

To Base:

ate the situation is?
promised air cover?

88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p . 33•

Where is our jet

Do you people realize how desper

Pepd.
Pepe.

To Air Commander:
(Italics mine.)

Where is

Ken Thompson

71+

of the Dallas Morning News said:

"San Roman's statement

Eo the Attorney Generajp bms become extremely useful in
what appears to be an obvious campaign to rewrite history
/
and to absolve the administration of its share of the blame
for the fiasco.
In retrospect, the debate over the issue of air
strikes and air cover was wasted activity.

Even with air

superiority, it is a question whether the 1^00 men landed
at the Bay of Pigs could have withstood Castro's assault.
He had available a 30,000-man army, besides his militia-a force totalling a quarter of a million men.

They were

equipped with the newest weapons from Russia and CzechoSlovakia, which included tanks, cannon, and howitzers. 91
When news of the invasion reached Castro he was in
Havana.

It came as no surprise--his agents in Miami had

been reporting to him for months that an expeditionary
force was being readied and equipped.

At least a hundred

known Castro intelligence agents circulated freely in the
buildup area.

Their photographs were on file in the Dade

County, Florida, sheriff's office, but no effort was made
by Federal authorities to remove them from the scene. 92
90Ken Thompson, "Contradictions on Air Cover," Dallas
(Texas) Morning News, February 5? 1963^Thayer, Guerrilla, p. 12.
92"The Invasion That Could Not Succeed," Reporter,
May 11, 1961, p. 22; James Reston, stated in the New York
Times, May 2, 1961:
"The only people who knew very little
about what was happening. . . were the American people who
were unknowingly picking up the tab."
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On March i|, Castro's newspaper Revolucion, devoted almost
the entire issue to news stories and photographs of the
preparations being made in the rebel camps and airfields in
Florida and in Central America.

Castro, in speaking

about the first air strike, said:
We knew that the air raid was not just a harass
ment but a military operation designed to des
troy our air force. Therefore we figured the
aggression would come soon. . . . Tactically
speaking, the air raid was an error because it
gave us a chance to take measures. We mobilized
all combat units.95
Some tactical errors came under close scrutiny and
criticism.

For example, to have loaded all the signal

equipment, the greater part of the ammunition, and the high
command (Manuel Artime) in a single vessel was a military
error.

Castro had ordered his half dozen planes to ignore

the landing force and concentrate on the invasion fleet.
Early in the action the Houston was hit by a rocket and
grounded; a little later a Sea Fury, diving out of the sun,
made a direct hit on the Rio Escondido which carried the
supplies for the first ten days of fighting--ammunition,
food, hospital equipment, and gasoline.

Haynes Johnson was

of the opinion that even had the Houston and the Rio Escon
dido gotten ashore, it is again a question whether it would
have made a crucial difference in the one-sided struggle.
Pepe/ San Roman, the brigade commander, said they might
^ Revolucion, March 5» 1961.
9^-Monahan and Gilmore, The Great Deception, p. 111.

76

have succeeded with 15,000 men instead of 1 ,500. ^
When the White Paper on Cuba was published,

it

clearly indicated that the American Government was well
/
aware of the magnitude of Cuba's military build up.

It

seems incredible that the overthrow, with such a small
force, was even attempted.

The question is often asked:

Why did the United States choose this particular time for
the invasion?

Ross and Wise expressed the opinion that

President Kennedy and his administration "were tasting the
wine of victory and of power.

The young energetic admin

istration suffered from a bad case of overconfidence."^6
Most studies of the period reveal the following reasons for
the invasion at this time:

Allegedly, Castro was to re

ceive, early in 1961, substantial deliveries of Soviet jet
fighters and that Cuban pilots to man them were being
trained in Czechoslovakia; the Guatemala government was
threatening to throw the "Freedom Fighters" out of its
country--President Ydigoras was under considerable pressure
at home because of the camps; and the rebel army was grow
ing restive--it would be impossible to sustain the morale
of the exiles if they did not get into action.

Thayer

pointed out another, and probably more likely factor:

"The

customary impatience of the American public, particularly
those who owned property in Cuba, must have put heavy
^Haynes Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 113.
^ R o s s and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 35.
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pressure on the Americans who were dealing with the sit
uation.
The Kennedy administration had strained hard to cont
vince the world that it did not plan to commit United
States military forces.

The story in Washington was that

the attempt to overthrow Castro was entirely a Cuban af
fair.

Many Americans, nevertheless, took part.

American

frogmen scouted Cuban beaches in advance of attack--one
American frogman was with the Cuban underwater teams that
went ashore with the brigade.

On the third day of the in

vasion four American pilots were killed in B-26 bombers
over Cuba.

Navy jets with insignias obliterated were all

lined up and ready to go on air strips at Key West, Flo
rida .
Why did United States involvement in the invasion
come as a surprise to Americans when the whole world, in
cluding Cuba, seemed to have full knowledge of it?

The Cu

ban radio was broadcasting all about the rebel camps, and
the United States government's part in them, weeks before
they were discussed in the American newspapers.
to Light and Marzani:

According

"Few stories have been more grossly

^Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 295; Tully, The Inside Story,
p. 251; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 239; Wallace Carrol
New York Times, April 21, 196T, p . 23; Theodore Draper,
Castro's Revolucion (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962),
p. 90; Fuller, Year of Trial, p. 52.
"Bay of Pigs: The Curtain is Lifting," United
States News & World Report, March 11, 1963, p. 3^7
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mishandled--the story was there for all to see but the
editors chose to wear blinders.n<^

The Nation, in an

editorial on November 19, I960, presented the story by Doc/
tor Ronald Hilton of Stanford University, in which he de
scribed the CIA’s activities in Guatemala as it was re
ported on the front page of La Hora, Guatemala's leading
newspaper.

The issue containing the editorial, together

with a copy of a news release based on the editorial, were
distributed to all major news media.

The dispatch of the

releases was followed by telephone calls to various news
desks.
The reactions were puzzling.

Jesse Gordon said the

Associated Press was called three times:

Each time a dif

ferent man answered, professed interest in the story, but
said he hadn't seen either the release or a proof of the
editorial.

Could duplicates be sent immediately?"

Three

duplicates in as many hours were sent, but nothing happened
--someone in the AP hierarchy squelched the story.

It was

not used by either the AP or the United Press Interna..
n 101
txonal.
A few days later Francis L. McCarty, head of the UPI
Latin America service's desk, when asked, stated that there
^Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 38.
■'"^Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon, "The Press and
the Bay of Pigs," The Columbia University Forum, Fall 1967*
(not page numbered).

101 Ibid.
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was a big base in operation in Guatemala, but the Pentagon
denied any knowledge of it and the State Department said,
"no comment."

He went on to say, one story had it, that

this was to be a replacement for Guantanamo. 102
The November 20th New York Times reported an inter/
view with Guatemala's President Miguel Ydigoras in which
he was asked about a "base" established with United States
assistance as a training ground for military action against
Cuba.

He branded any such report a lie--the base was to be

used by the Guatemalan Army for training in guerrilla warfare to guard against invasions.

^

The AP also inter

viewed Ydigoras and received the same story.

Both corre

spondents chose to interview the one man who would be cer
tain to deny the story.

Fundamental rules of reporting

should have dictated that they at least check with the La
Hora reporter who wrote the original story, or if it was
common knowledge as Dr. Hilton reported, they could have
talked with any man on the street.
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, not satisfied with the
AP report, sent its own man, Richard Dudman, into Guatemala.
He stayed clear of the Presidential Palace and got his an
swers from the public.

He was told of a secret air-strip,

and that many of the soldiers there spoke with a "Cuban ac
cent."

Mr. Dudman had censorship difficulties and had to
102 Ibid.

-*-93]flew York Times, November 20, I960, p. 32.
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post his story in neighboring El Salvador.

The following

editorial from the Post-Dispatch should have awakened the
nations’ press:
i

What is going on in Guatemala? Who is trying to
conceal what, and for what purpose? Why should
Richard Dudman . . . have to go to neighboring
El Salvador to send a dispatch to this newspaper
about what he found in Guatemala?10^
About the middle of December the Los Angeles Mirror
sent its aviation editor, Don Dwiggins, to Guatemala to
find out what was taking place.

He told of air base con

struction and airstrips in which American funds were in
volved.

He questioned why Guatemala's air-force consist

ing of a few war weary and corroding surplus fighters
would need a jet airstrip for military use.

An anti-Castro

pilot told him of an air-raid operation scheduled for
early 1961, and that people high up in the American govern
ment were offering $25,000 for pilots to fly the mission.
The sum of all these stories should have convinced the
nation's press that United States was involved in a clan
destine operation against Cuba.10^
On January 3, when the United States broke relations
with Castro, the New York Times said, the action was taken
because we had finally lost patience with the propaganda
offensive from Havana, charging the United States with plans
for invasion, but ignored Castro's charge that the embassy
^^Bernstein and Gordon, "The Press and the Bay of
Pigs, " The Columbia University Forum, Pall 1967.
105
Ibid.
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was being used as an espionage center.

The Times inferred

that the purpose of the anti-American propaganda was to
divert minds that would be preoccupied with dissatisfaction
at home.10^
Paul Kennedy, Latin American correspondent for the
New York Times, sent a dispatch that was printed on January
10 in which he described the build-up in Guatemala, using
American facilities, material, and personnel.

He did not

identify the guerrillas under training or clarify the pur
pose.

The article was very circumspect, yet, this was the

story that at a later date was pointed to by President Ken
nedy as an example of "premature disclosures of security
information.
The country as a whole now became aware of something
peculiar going on in Guatemala.

Still unmentioned was the

CIA involvement that Dr. Hilton had earlier suggested.

Be

ginning on January 8, the New York Daily News began a se
ries of articles on these activities.
Varona, saying:

Quoted was Manuel

"Our invasion force will land in Cuba.

. . . A provisional government will be set up . . . which
will restore all property to the rightful owners."

The

Daily News suggested that financing was coming from Cuban
and American industrial interests who hoped to get their
-t-O^New York Times, January 8, 1961, p. 15.
Ibid., January 10, 1961, p. 12.
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property back.-*-®®
The Miami editors, who were not unaware of what was
going on but had suppressed the story, now decided there
I

was no longer any point in withholding it.

The day after

the Times broke with their story on Guatemala the Miami
Herald published full information on invasion activities.*
10®
The story continued to expand, and Washington, now aware
that they could not stop speculation, began to leak stories
to the press tending to justify the pending invasion.

On

April ip, Tad Szulc, Latin American correspondent for Time,
told the whole story, linking the CIA with the invasion
that was now imminent.
President Kennedy, at a press meeting, shortly after
the Bay of Pigs had turned to dismal history, criticized
what he considered premature disclosures.

He was particu

larly critical of the New York Times, but at the same time
said that he wished they had, "printed more about the opera
tion, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."
James Reston was certain that any amount of disclosure at
this time would not have helped.

By the time the American

people were fully aware of what was taking place the plans
were beyond aborting.

The time for arousing public opposi

tion was back in October, I960.

The persistency with which

10®New York Daily News, January 8, 1961, p. 12.
10®Bernstein and Gordon, "The Press and the Bay of
Pigs," The Columbia University Forum, Fall 1967*
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the American press ignored the story still seems incred
ible.

Actually there was no security to breach--Castro had

complete information on all details.

Bernstein and Gordon

wrote:
The early apathy of the press makes sense only
when viewed as motivated not so much by patri
otic reticence as by eager jingoistic collab
oration. The fact is that most powerful Amer
ican publishers wanted Castro out. . . . So
they kept silent until a few independent souls
precipitated the news competition. . . . But
the damage had already been done: public opinion
had been eliminated as a factor in a major for
eign policy decision. ^
(italics mine.)
Apparently there were no press reporters accompany
ing the invasion forces.

All information was put out in

the name of the Cuban Revolutionary Council by press re
leases dictated by CIA to the firm of Lem Jones Associates,
Inc., of New York, hired for the purpose.
a farce.

The result was

On the basis of these news releases, headlines

throughout the nation recounted mass uprisings against
Castro, Soviet MIGs and Soviet submarines blasting the in
vaders, Cuban Navy in revolt, while all this time the in
vading force was being destroyed by Castro forces.

The Am

erican press was deliberately fed u n t r u t h s . T h e New
•^^Ibid.
~^^Ibid. On April 19, a dispatch was forwarded by a
Times correspondent at Guantanamo Bay, which states:
"The
sensitive radar on Navy ships picked up no trace of high
speed Cuban or communist aircraft, nor have any foreign
submarines been sighted by the Navy." Officials were con
fident that there were no MIG fighters in the area of Cuba.

284807

8^
York Times said that the press had been debased for the
government's purpose.

In an editorial on May 10, it was

firmly stated:

/

A democracy, . . our democracy, . . cannot be
lied to. This is one of the factors that make
it more precious, more difficult, and yet es
sentially stronger than any other form of gov
ernment in the world. . . . A dictatorship can
get along without an informed public opinion,
a democracy c a n not.H2
There was tragedy in the invasion failure, but after
the smoke of battle had cleared and after sober thought
there were many who felt that the failure was not as tragic
as it seemed.

The Hon. Thomas Pelley stated:

"That the

present effort has apparently failed in no way diminished
the gallantry of the attempt

3

An editorial in the

Washington Post, in attempting to justify the invasion, rea
soned that giving physical and moral support on this oc
casion was not an evasion of American principles, or of
international commitments.

It was no different from the

English and French situation in Suez.*
1-^
There were many, however, who felt that the prestige
of the United States had been seriously damaged.

"We Am

ericans," wrote C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times,
-'■■'-^James Reston, "The President and Press, the Old
Dilemma," New York Times, May 10, 1961, p. Ip8 .
1-L^U. S., Congressional Record, Hon. Thomas Pelley,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, 6529.
^ ^ Washington Post, April 25 > 1961, p. ip.
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"look like fools to our friends, rascals to our enemies,
and incompetent to the rest."1-*-^ Readers Digest said:
"The invasion shocked the American people and damaged our i
-j-|L
leadership and prestige throughout the world."
The
Nation emphasized that it was a serious breach of national
and international law.-'--1-^

Newsweek reported:

"At best,

the United States appears before the world as a meddler, at
worst as a nation which pretends to virtue yet seems to
•j 1 Q

have committed open aggression against a tiny nation."
Time described the rejoicing in Cuba:

"On Havana

street corners groups of prancing militiamen fired their
Czech burp guns into the air, and jeeps draped with hot
eyed youths careened along the avenues, communist country
correspondents were hustled to the beachhead to view the
wreckage of invasion--United States-made mortars, trucks,
recoilless rifles, machine guns, etc."11^

Castro's April

21, Revolucion, devoted the entire issue to showing cap
tured American equipment, and the April 22 issue featured
-^-^ N e w York Times, May 5> 1961, p. 58.
H ^ L a z o , "Decision for Disaster," Readers Digest,
September I96I4., p. 2I4.I.
g. Smith, "Bay of Pigs:
Nation, April 13 , I96I4., p. 360.
Il8"cuba:

Unanswered Questions,"

The Consequences," Newsweek, May 1, 1961,

p. 23.
119"Bitter Week:
1961, pp. 11-13.

Cuban Invasion," Time, April 28,

86
several pages of messages, letters, and date-line reports
from all over the world indicating support and sympathy for
Cuba.

Pravda said that the United States was trying to<

pursue Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" policy.

"Today ob

viously it is not the biggest and longest . . . the other
side has just as long’ and not less weighty sticks."
deplored United States intervention.
ported:

India

Rio de Janeiro re

"Whatever may be the result of the battle, we

should make clear our support for Cuba's legitimate dem
ocratic objectives."

In Caracas, the Venezuelan legisla

ture unanimously condemned "any armed intervention in Cuba
or in any other country."
American news media also told of world reaction.
Newsweek reported:

"Within twenty-four hours of the anti-

Castro invasion the news had swept around the world . . .
touching off a global surge of anti-Americanism communist
protest meetings staged in Moscow, Peking, and satellite
countries,"^21

There was a good deal of undisguised pleas

ure in England, as told by Esquire, at the discomfiture of
the CIA.

122

Life found that among neutrals and even among

friends the reaction was adverse.

NATO nations exhibited*
1

^^^Revolucion, April 21 and 22, 1961.
1PI
"Cuba: The Consequences” Newsweek, May 1, 1961,
p. 25.
122

M. Muggeridge, "Bay of Pigs," Esquire, September
196U-, p. 71.
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both scorn and dismay at the bungling.*
12-^

Wallace Carrol,

writing for the New York Times, reported that the "old feel
ing of 'yankee' intervention was stirred in the hemisphere,
and a division occured among delegations of the American
Republics at the United Nations," yet, "there was a great
deal of support in Latin America and a great deal more that
did not come to the surface."

Many leaders did not pub

licly back the invasion for fear of rousing leftist senti
ment, but actually hoped that the Castro regime soon would
fall.12^
The Cuban invasion was a horribly costly lesson;
but it was well learned.

In later months the President's

father would tell him that "in its perverse way, the Bay of
Pigs was not a misfortune but a benefit."

This was small

consolation, but no one can doubt that failure in Cuba in
1961 contributed to a firmer policy that brought about the
removal of missile bases in 1962.^2p

But if the United

States policy in Latin America is represented only in the
word "firmness" then it has not learned the lesson well.
123”Bitter Fruits of Defeat," Life, April 28, 1961,
pp. 22-23.
12^Carrol, New York Times, April 21, 1961, p.
12^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 297.

CHAPTER IV
Midwest Response
The press in the Midwest appeared to be quite unaware
of any unusual activity leading to intervention in Cuba un
til after the failure.

This was no doubt a reflection of

the lack of coverage of the story by the national news re
porting services and the big city dailies.

However, the

Jamestown Sun and the Grand Forks Herald did report, early
in April, on secret military camps in the Canal zone whose
purpose it was to train Cubans in guerrilla and anti
guerrilla tactics, and the accusation by Raul Roa, Cuba’s
minister to the United Nations that the United States was
directing an invasion plot against Cuba.

There was also

a report of the announcement made by Dr. Jose Miro Cardona,
President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council of a "second
war of liberation," to overthrow Castro.^

The Minneapolis

Tribune expressed its unhappiness over a situation in which
the people who knew least about what was happening in the
early stages of the exercise were the American people who
were paying the bill.

It was in hopes, however, that the

attempt to overthrow Castro would succeed, but suggested
that should it succeed, the varying and conflicting
1James town Sun, April 10, 1961, p. 2; Grand Forks
Herald, April 10, 1961, p. 1+.
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political views held by the participating groups in the
anti-Castro front..might be a problem for any postp
revolutionary government that took over.
The "post-mortems" in the Midwest were similar to
the national response, but milder and in most cases more
constructive.

The Mandan Pioneer was opposed to any temp

tation to find a scapegoat but wondered how it came about
that the CIA so grossly miscalculated the Cuban situation.
The nation, it believed, must guard against giving too
much responsibility to any federal intelligence agency, and
while the CIA has its place it should not be in a position
to formulate top-level policy.

The Pioneer was happy to

know that President Kennedy had ordered an investigation of
the CIA and hoped that the United States would not again be
caught off base because of poor intelligence.8

The Devils

Lake Daily Journal called attention to an aspect of the CIA
which few people realize:

that it is the only governmental

agency which does not have to submit its expenses to any
accounting except the chief executive's.

"Through the

years the CIA has been able to cloak its inefficiency from
all eyes but those of the President.

Its failures," it

commented, "put serious dents in American prestige."^-

The

Jamestown Sun made the suggestion that the CIA should be
^Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1961, p. Ip.
^Mandan Pioneer, April 28, 1961, p. Ip, and May 5?
1961, pT T ^
^-Devils Lake Daily Journal, May 9, 1961, p. Ip.
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overhauled both in method and personnel.

In its opinion

the organization had too many "political philosophers" who
do their own evaluation and too few ordinary spies who proi
vide data without evaluation.

Nothing would appease the

American people more than the reorganization of the CIA and
the State Department and the elimination of those who had
caused the confusion.-^

The Albert Lea (Minnesota) Evening

Tribune said that the agency should forget its "cloak and
dagger" business and depend more on scientific techniques,
favoring the idea as in Britain that intelligence and spe
cial operations should be handled by separate agencies.^
The guerrilla-training operation was criticized by the
Minot Daily News because the United States had never been
equipped for that kind of warfare, and certainly the CIA
had no capabilities in this area.

It should confine it

self to information gathering and be relieved of all such
responsibility, for guerrilla warfare was largely a mil
itary problem.^
When Senator McCarthy of Minnesota introduced a res
olution in the Senate suggesting that the CIA should come
under the scrutiny of the elected branch of the government,
under a "watchdog" committee, the Waterloo (Iowa) Courier
took issue with him, contending, that of all the things
^ James town Sun, April 28, 1961, and May 8, 1961, p. I)..
6Albert Lea (Minnesota) Evening Tribune, May Iq, 1961,
p. iq.
^Minot Daily News, April 28, 1961, p. iq.
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wrong with CIA it could not conceive of a single one being
corrected by a "Watchdog" committee.

Every other intelli

gence service in the world operated in complete secrecy ,
which was necessary also for the American agency if it were
to fulfill its functions.

The Courier further pointed out

that an intelligence agency was expected to carry out mis
sions which the government could repudiate.

How could the

government repudiate something an official Congressional
Q

committee had been supervising?
There were political overtones in the comments made
by the Albert Lea Evening Tribune.

In its April 26 issue

it called attention to Kennedy's scornful dismissal of
the Eisenhower-Nixon effort to contain Cuba's "mad-man,"
but it was happy that Kennedy had swallowed his fierce
pride and it called on Eisenhower to give him aid in rally
ing the citizens of the nation behind his administration.
The editorial in the May 15 issue stated:
There is a vast reservoir of resentment against
the cockiness of the Hew Frontiersmen exhibited
during the campaign. They had a fine contempt
for Eisenhower's policies at containment of com
munism and the more these conceited young men
flounder, the wiser Eisenhower, Nixon and com
pany appear.9
The Dickinson Press registered disapproval of the
administration not seriously considering the consequences
of failure.

It wanted "to keep its cake and eat it too."

O

°WaterIoo (Iowa) Courier, May 1$, 1961, p. !(..
9Albert Lea Evening Tribune, May 1%, 1961, p_. Ij..
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In pursuit of a "tight-rope" course which sought to assist
the assault, but manage it in a manner to keep its part se
cret, it doomed the enterprise from the start.101 The Press
i
had been more conciliatory in an earlier statement that we
should rid ourselves of the idea that "we as proud Ameri
cans must be best in everything we undertake, the idea
that when we do fail, the blame must inevitably fall upon
some sharply visible villain--a man or an agency."11

The

Minot Daily News registered disappointment that the Presi
dent had not been protected by the "new hands" Walt Rostow,
McGeorge Bundy, Arthur Schlesinger,

Jr., and Dean Rusk

against the bad advice of the "old hands" Richard Bissell
and Allen Dulles of CIA, General Lyman Lemnitzer and
Admiral Arleigh Burke of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adolfe
Berle in the State Department.

The Mankato (Minnesota)

Free Press commented on this, saying that any attempt to
blame a single group--including the liberal-minded intellectuals--was allowing "prejudice to overcome sound judge
ment."1-^

The facts indicated that the older men had erred

just as disastrously as had the younger men.

The Press

made no verbal attacks on Kennedy personally, and the
criticism directed at the administration was not very
10Dickinson Press, May l8, 1961, p. L|_.
11Ibid., May 2, 1961, p. l±.
^ Minot Daily News, May ip, 1961, p. 2.
^Mankato (Minnesota) Free Press, May 6, 1961, p. 10.
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severe.

When Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall in

a television interview charged President Eisenhower with
responsibility for the Cuban Invasion, saying it had been
planned under him, the Bismarck Tribune was severe in its
challenge.

In its opinion, Udall was a "so-so" congressman

until he joined the cabinet, and now "came a cropper" when
he attempted to place responsibility for the fiasco on the
shoulders of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

If such contention

were correct, Kennedy would not appear as a very "strong"
president, for he would be conceding that "Ike and Dick"
continued to be in charge. ^
On the question of the value and use of the Cuban un
derground, the Grand Forks Herald predicted that once the
invasion was underway and leadership thereby given to re
sistance groups, there would be greatly increased defec
tions from the Castro government.

The report from an un

derground leader insisted that his organization had more
than 15,000 dues-paying members in Havana province alone.
Later, when this defection did not occur, the Herald said
Castro had time to arrest and scatter those who might have
served as leaders, and an uprising around the provinces and
cities would be extremely difficult.-^

In a later issue

the conclusion had been reached that a large segment of*
1
-^Bismarck Tribune, May 3, 1961, p. 1+.
1^Grand Porks Herald, April 16, 1961, p. L|_, and April
20, 1961, p. 1±-

9k

the Cuban people were sold on Castro's propaganda and land
reform, particularly the landless peasant who could have
been the biggest asset to a revolutionary force who, when
he was given or promised land, became a firm Castro sup
po r ter.^

The Jamestown Sun submitted that the peasant who

helped feed Castro's guerrilla fighters when he was waging
war against Batista would not be likely to help overthrow
him.

Other segments of the Cuban society would also be

watching the progress of the drive against Castro to see
if the big foreign estates were to be returned to their
owners, and if the bathing beaches would once again be re
served for the elite of Havana and rich American tourists.
If this were proposed, the uprising would not get much sup
port inside Cuba.1^

Considering the limited strength of

the anti-Castro forces which landed in Cuba, the Saint Paul
Pioneer Press expressed the opinion that the success of
the invasion attempt had to rely on support from the Cuban
population.

It placed the blame on CIA for giving incom

plete reports and convincing the administration that popular support would be forthcoming.

"How could it be,"

wrote the Minneapolis Tribune, "that this organization with
all its access to Cuba and to the friendly nations in this
l^ibid., April 22, 1961, p. k17Jamestown Sun, April lip, 1961, p. i|.
l^Saint Paul Pioneer Press, April 23, 1961, p. 6.
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hemisphere, could be so sure the Cubans would revolt, and
be so wrong on this critical point.

. . ."19

The Dickinson

Press registered disappointment in the CIA which, because
of a lack of trust, did not inform the Cuban underground
when the invasion was to take place and also held members
of the top revolutionary council Incommunicado while issu
ing statements in their name.20

The Valley City Times de

clared that the United States intelligence was faulty in
its reports on how much armament Fidel Castro had and also
on the likelihood of a hoped-for uprising.

"It is easy for

Americans," it said, "with their distaste for dictatorship
to think that because they despise Castro, all Cubans
d o ."21
Opinions on the issues of the morality and legality,
the right and wrong, of the involvement, were quite
equally divided.

The Waterloo Daily Courier took rather

a militant stand, premised on the belief that the neu
trality act and certain aspects of the Pan-American treaty
did not adequately cover the existing situation.

If we

were prohibited from any action to help our friends,
then we were in a desperate state indeed.

It stated:

"What the communists take by force of arms may rightly
be taken from them by force of arms, any other doctrine
^ Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1961, p. [|_.
20pickinson Press, May 18, 1961, p. l+.
21yalley City Times, April 2i|_, 1961, p. 2 and April
26, 1961, p. 2.
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perpetuates the communists in power and guarantees our de
feat. "22

The Fairmont (Minnesota)

Sentinel declared that

if we are to survive in the world of today we may have to

t

revise a doctrine which says "we will never start a war or
fire that first shot.

We must dare to take a stand for

what we know to be right, as our forefathers did before
us,n23

The Red Wing (Minnesota) Republican Eagle expressed

the philosophy that as long as Uncle Sam was being blamed
for everything that happened to Castro anyway, this nation
would lose nothing by offering something besides mere sym
pathy to the Cuban people. 2^-

The only course left open to

us, declared the Albert Lea Evening Tribune, was to "risk
war if we want peace.

The thickening crust of communism

can no longer be laughed away.

What this all means, of

course, is that we must now drop our 'holier-than-thou' dip
lomatic pose and admit to the world that we are prepared to
destroy those who seek to destroy u s ."25

The Bismarck Tri

bune thought it was perhaps time for the United States to
show that it would not hesitate to shoot if it had to.

The

United States being the seat and strength of freedom, it*
2
^ Waterloo Daily Courier, April li|, 1961, p. i|_.
2 3Fa irmont (Minnesota) Sentinel, April 21, 1961.
2^4-Red Wing (Minnesota) Republican Eagle, April 21,
1961.
2j?Albert Lea Evening Tribune, April 2b., 1961, p.
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declared, "it is responsible for the failures, and has
the obligation to restore the successes. D
Serious misgivings were voiced with any plan which
might result in overt action.
Boomerang asked:
standard?

The Laramie (Wyoming) Daily

"Is this country operating on a double

How can it preach non-intervention in the United

Nations and then aid in an uprising against Cuba?"

It

went on to say that no matter how repugnant the Castro re
gime might be, direct force must not be used against it.
As a nation we "must practice what we preach. "27

The same

theme was stressed by the Saint Paul Pioneer Press, saying
that since this nation, along with other members of the
OAS, had signed a resolution against intervention, it now
had a responsibility to maintain a "hands off" policy.28
The Minot Daily News said:

"Thoughtful Americans fear

United States involvement and the consequences that might
spring from it."

Such involvement would damage relation

ships with other Latin-American governments and provide
tremendous new impetus for the cries of "Yankee Imperial
ism."

The long range aims of democracy would not be well

served in this manner.29

The Fargo Forum expressed sym

pathy for both anti-Batista and anti-Castro forces, but said
2£>Bismarck Tribune, April 22, 1961, p. Iq.
27Lauamie_ (Wyoming) Daily Boomerang, April 23, p. iq.
28ga jnt Paul Pioneer Press, April 15, 1961, p. Jq.
29 Minot Daily News, April 19, 1961, p. Iq.
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that the United States forces must not take part in an is
land invasion.30

The Brainerd (Minnesota) Dispatch and the

Winona (Minnesota) Daily News strongly urged that the
United States not interfere in an affair that, for all its
international implications, was essentially the business of
the Cuban people.31

The United States government does not

want Castro to win, stated the Des Moines (Iowa) Register,
yet, direct intervention would violate pledges made by two
presidents and would place premier Kruschev in a position
in which he would have to "welsh1' on his promises to Cuba
or take counter action by force of arms.32

The Sioux Falls

(South Dakota) Argus Leader said substantially the same
thing.

It was certain that Russia would not just sit still

while the United States was invading Cuba, and aside from
that, how could the United States say to the mid-American
and the South American nations that it was its right to de
termine the rulerships of Cuba.33

The Mankato Free Press

took a like position but wanted the world to know that when
the President took a firm stand against interference in
Cuba he was reflecting American opinion, and stressed that
though we did not want trouble,

"we didn't intend to be

30pargo Forum, April 19, 1961, p. 1|.
3lBrainerd (Minnesota) Dispatch, April 21, 1961;
Winona (Minnesota) Daily News, April 21, 1961.
32Des Moines (Iowa) Register, April 19, 1961, p. l8.
33sioux Falls (South Dakota) Argus Leader, April 26,
p. Ij..
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pushed around.11^
It seemed to the Minneapolis Tribune that anything
the United States did would be judged wrong.

The failure

to unseat the Castro regime was being judged as a "blow to
our prestige," but so would the continued existence of a
pro-communist government at our very doorstep.

It would

not have enhanced our prestige if we had rejected the pleas
of anti-Castro forces for help, and if Castro had toppled
at first blow, we still would be under attack in many parts
of the world.33

The Mandan Pioneer had a different slant

to its observation.

The Washington leadership of the free

world, it declared, had not been undermined, and the de
cline in its prestige, if any, would come from misinter
pretations of what happened.

If the invaders had been di

rectly aided by United States forces and then suffered de
feat, it continued, one could properly conclude that the
event was a blow to this nation's prestige, but this was
not the c a s e . i n

like manner, the Williston Herald said

that it was ridiculous to suggest, as Castro had charged,
that any United States land, sea, or air forces were in
volved.

Had they been, the outcome would have been dif

ferent, "as any informed person would know."37
34Mankato Free Press, April 21, 1961, p. JL|_.
^ Minneapolis Tribune, April 23, 1961, p. 2.
3^Mandan Pioneer, April 27, 1961, p. [)..
37williston Herald, April 23, 1961, p. I4..
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After the invasion failure, anti-United States com
ments were heard from friend and foe alike.

The Waterloo

Sunday Courier in an apparently angry protest said:

"The

United States would not have endured any more criticism for
sending marines into Cuba than it had already received for
not preventing the invasion."

It believed that:

"it was

probably time now to apply the fundamental rule of selfpreservation and accept whatever loss in good will would be
involved to protect this hemisphere against communism."38
The Jamestown Sun, however, pointed out that we ourselves
had sharply criticized our handling of the abortive Cuban
affair, we could hardly be surprised that our allies had
voiced their own complaints about it.

It went on to say

that possibly the Cuban fiasco, for all its mismanagement,
may have done more to alert Latin America to communist
peril than anything else that might have happened.39
The Bismarck Tribune attacked outside criticism by saying
that, had the Cuban Freedom Fighters succeeded, President
Kennedy would have been written off in the biased history
of the neutralist and leftists as an "American imperialist."
The inference being that, "a weak United States is 'pro
gressive'; a strong United States is 'imperialist'."3
38Wa terloo Sunday Courier, May 30, 1961, p. 8.
39 James town Sun, May 11, 1961, p. 1+.
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It continued by saying that perhaps American prestige would
be better served by a little more "muscle" and a little
less talk, during the months ahead.
Ed Doherty, editor of the New Rockford Transcript,
commented on the coincidence that Eleanor Roosevelt and
Walter Reuther were outspoken against former Dictator
Batista simply because he was a despot, but now favored
Castro--another dictator.

Why oppose a dictator who was at

least a pro-American and now support one who was procommunist?^--*-

The editor of the Casselton Reporter ex

pressed his unhappiness over the thought that the United
States had for years subsidized Cuban sugar and given her
millions in foreign aid; this money was now being used to
finance Cuban embassies throughout Latin America from which
the Kremlin "directs a deadly stream of communist propa
ganda and intrigue .
In a letter to the editor, George H. Perry of Sioux
Palls, South Dakota, said that President Kennedy should
send the marines into Cuba to restore democratic govern
ment.

"It seems to me that we have to make a start some

where," he said, "and where could be better than 90 miles
from our shores."
opinion:

The Argus Leader did not agree; in its

"To say that we must go to war is to say that

^ Bismarck Tribune, May 11, 1961, p. l±.
^--*-New Rockford Transcript, June 8, 1961, p. 2.
^ Casselton Reporter, April 28, 1961.
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virtual suicide is the only answer.

Certainly there is a

better fate than that in store for mankind, and I like to
believe we can achieve it through the exercise of our best
intelligence.''^4-3

"The idea that it is all right for the

United States to impose its will upon smaller nations,"
said the Mandan Pioneer, "is untenable.

America must be

true to herself, being committed to a concept that people
must work out their own destinies."
mented:

A later issue com

"We must certainly shun, except in the most ex

treme emergency, any action that would damage our world
position as a champion of freedom, dedicated to the attain
ment of an orderly, peaceful w o r l d . I n

reviewing the

invasion, General Douglas MacArthur stated that Cuba was
no mortal threat to the United States, and that we must
now wait until the people of Cuba worked out their own
salvat ion
The Mankato Free Press offered good advice:

"The

policy of staying out of other people's affairs should be
basic to our policy."

Commenting also on the value of an

informed public, the Press stated that it was the American
people who finally determined national policy, by knowing
fully what their government representatives wanted to do.
^ gjoux Falls Argus Leader, May 1, 1961, p. I±.
^ Mandan Pioneer, May 1+, 1961, p. i|, and May 2$,
1961, p. i*..
^-3>Grand Forks Herald, May 2, 1961, p.

I4..
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The public can not fulfill its role without being ade
quately informed.^
In summary it seems clear, in spite of some voices
.„
to the contrary, that there was little concern over the

f

alleged Cuban communist threat that had become such an
obsession with the national news media.

Public opinion as

expressed by the press in the Upper-Midwest, influenced
perhaps by traditional isolationism, suggested a sane and
sensible "hands-off" policy.

It understood that this was

a search on the part of the Cuban people for a better life
and they had the right to carry on the struggle free from
foreign interference.
^Manka to Free Press, April 29, 1961, p. 8.

CHAPTER V
Observations and Conclusions
The Bay of Pigs remains an ominous page in our his
tory.

The United States must postulate its acts on sounder

grounds than it used to justify giving aid to this abortive
invasion, and weigh more surely the consequences of such
attempts and failures.

Too much planning was centered on

the military take over in Cuba with too little of it aimed
toward the future.

There has been too much concern with a

negative anti-communism, not realizing that there may be
other forms of government that may accomplish as much for
the happiness and welfare of its people as a democracy.
The tragedy of the Bay of Pigs was not in the failure, ex
cept for the lives lost, but in the attempt.

The real

question is not whether the Cubans could have won had all
things gone well, but whether they could have fashioned a
workable government had they succeeded.

It is well never

theless, to reflect on and learn the lessons taught by the
failure.
Foreign policy in a large measure must be based on
intelligence about other countries, including the friendly
ones.

The world has become so complicated that the Presi

dent has neither the time nor the resources to do his own
evaluating of this intelligence.

Confronted with this
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problem, President Truman created the CIA when he estab
lished the National Security Act of 19^7.

He asserted that

he conceived of the CIA primarily as "a co-ordinating and
intelligence-gathering aid to a modern President who needed
concise, centralized information on which to base national
policy."

By 1961 the intelligence apparatus had gone far

beyond what Truman had anticipated.

In criticism of this

developement he stated:
I . . . would like to see the CIA restored to
its original assignment as the intelligence arm
of the President. . . . There is something omi
nous about the way the CIA has been functioning
that is casting a shadow over our historical
position and I feel that we need to correct it.
No agency should be permitted to operate without some form
of independent, critical outside examination--an agency
should not sit in judgment of itself.

The CIA should be

solely a body to gather intelligence, weigh it and inter
pret it if required, but not to make policy decisions.

In

spite of the need to operate in secrecy, the organization
must be placed under some surveilance; the administration,
the Congress, as well as the public have a vested interest
in what takes place.

After the Cuban debacle suggestions

were that the CIA be placed under the supervision of a
Committee on Intelligence, or a bi-partisan commission from
both House and Senate.

There is no reason why secrets

should leak in any greater degree from one formal committee
iRoss and Wise, The Invisible Government, p. 350-

106
than from the present group of informal sub-committees.
Ross and Wise pointed out that there has not been any leak
of classified data from the Joint Committee on Atomic Eneri

gy, or other such committees under surveilance.2
There are inherent weaknesses in our system of govern
ment.

They can be strong only when each department per

forms its functions completely, yet staying completely
within its prescribed limits.

The President must make him

self the final arbiter in the decison making process.

He

must understand that the bureaucracy under him can supply
intelligence, but may not itself be intelligent.

He must

remain independent from the collective thinking of his ad
visors, listen to their judgments but retire into himself
to make the final judgment--not even allowing his own
deeper feelings to influence his decisions.

The President

carries an awesome responsibility.
Kennedy was faced with two alternatives; to stage an
invasion of Cuba with American military support if neces
sary, or to abandon the project completely.

To avoid the

risks which either course of action seemed to manifest, he
chose a middle course, intervening just a little but not
enough to assure success, and so reaped a harvest of crit
icism that either course would have produced.

Commentary

suggests that this is the difference between a statesman
and a politician:

"The statesman must commit himself to

2lbid •J P- 355-
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a course of action to the exclusion of all others.

He

must cross the Rubicon or refrain from crossing it, he
cannot have it both ways.

A politician can equivocate be-

tween different courses of action and bridge the chasm be
tween incompatible positions by embracing them both."^
Wishful thinking substituting for intelligence led to a
politician's choice.

The lesson to be emphasized, overlook

ing the right and wrong of the operation, is that the coun
try's prestige and power should never be committed unless
it is prepared to commit every resource, if need be, with
but one thought--and that is to win.
native," said General Eisenhower.
tal thing in this world.

"There is no alter

"Force is a naked, bru

If you are going to use it, you

have got JsicQ to be prepared to go all the way."^
The Bay of Pigs demonstrated how virtually impossible
it is, without wartime conditions of censorship, to conduct
a secret operation of this magnitude and keep it secret in
an open society.

The press insists on its right to know

and print what is happening in government.

"One of the

great strengths of democracy is its openness," said Sena
tor Wayne Morse.

"The right of the American people in the

field of foreign policy is to be informed about proposed
^Hans Morgenthau, "The Trouble with Kennedy, "
Commentary, January 1962, p. $ 1 .
^TJ.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks of
Hon. John W. Wydler, quoting from an article by Earl Mazo
entitled, "Ike Speaks Out: Bay of Pigs was all J. F. K's."
89th Cong., 1st Sess. ASb'iS-
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policies that may determine the difference between peace
and war."^

In a free society attention should be given as

well to the increasing tendency of the American Government
to mislead the American people in its attempt to protect
secret operations.

In the U-2 incident, Linclon White,

.State Department spokesman gave assurances that "there was
absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air
space.

There never has been."

A few days before the Cu

ban Invasion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said:

"The Am

erican people are entitled to know whether we are inter
vening in Cuba or intend to do so in the near future.
answer to that question is no.
/
the Cuban people to decide."

The

What happens in Cuba is for

Even had the invasion succeeded it is doubtful that
it could have produced a viable political resolution to
Cuba's problems.

The concept of trying to put a right-

wing government that would have been branded as a Yankee
creation was dreadfully wrong.

A government imposed from

the outside is not a stable way of promoting and advancing
the social and economic welfare of a people.
A larger lesson involves the total American reaction
to the Cuban revolution.

In a sense, the invasion plan was

an extension of prevailing American attitudes to a revolu
tionary change.

For Cuba it was a rebellion against the

5 u .S ., Congressional Record, Senator Wayne Morse,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6580.
^Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 275*
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past; a declaration of independence from American business
interests, especially the sugar companies, so closely iden
tified with the landlordism that was the basic complaint of
i

the landless peasantry.

The American press overlooked or

failed to understand these basic causes of the revolution.
Prom the time of the executions in Cuba in the early
months of 1959, the American press, radio and television
were emotionally and overwhelmingly hostile.

Americans on

the scene were more realistic and sympathetic.
said:

Brennan

"The record shows plainly that, if any criminals de

served being put to death the Cuban war criminals certainly
did."7

David Binder, former president of the Harvard Law

Record, reported:
The impression this observer received is that it
is fair. The Cuban judicial system is founded
upon the civil law, rather than the English com
mon law. No jury is utilized. The war crimes
trials are held before three judges in military
tribunals. . . . No judge is likely to vote for
conviction if he has a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt.*
8
Victor Franco in The Morning After writes:
a revolution, you are obliged to kill.

"When you make

It is inevitable,

otherwise the revolution would not take place at all. . .
The French Revolution went through the same phase.
Americans should reflect on the mass killing that took
7Bre nnan, Castro, Cuba and Justice, p. 279.
8Ibid., p. 277^victor Franco, The Morning After (New York: Fred
erick A. Praeger, 1963T1 first published in France in 1962.
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place under Machado and Batista governments supported by
their country.

Herbert Matthews stated:

No one who knew the extremes of barbarism to
which the recent tortures in Cuba . . . have
gone, will be able to deny in conscience that
the corrective methods must be extreme. . . .
If the Provisional Government does not exe
cute the most noted criminals quickly, public
passion will overflow, outraged at the im
punity of the delay, and then the number of
dead will be many, many thousands.10
Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin commented wisely that,
"People striving for economic betterment, political freedom,
and national independence sometimes use methods we abhor
or go to extremes we deem unwise.

Even in such cases we

must uphold the principle of non-intervention." H
Once the label of communism was pinned on Fidel and
his regime early in 1959? the hysteria that accompanied the
American attitude toward communism worked its poison.

Mat

thews said this was due to a lack of understanding, and it
was tragic because it contributed so much to the develop
ing conflict between Cuba and the United States.

In his

opinion, it helped drive Fidel quicker and deeper into the
communist embrace.^

It seemed to the London Observer that

to "a far greater extent than they would like to admit, our
American friends are the prisoners of an ideology almost as
l°Matthews, The Cuban Story, p. 292.
Hu.S., Congressional Record, extension of remarks
of Hon. Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin, 87th Cong. 1st.
Sess. 6915'
■^Matthews, The Cuban Story, p. 285.
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narrow as that of the communists and just as fervently
believed.

The American ideology equates capitalism not

only with freedom but very nearly with virtue."13
i

Had the United States accepted Castro's reforms and
provided help in carrying out his program, it is likely that
nationalization would have been limited to a few key mono
polies such as oil, utilities and sugar mills, and if the
owners had been willing to accept payment in keeping with
Cuba's means to repay they would have been compensated.

In

the spring of I960 Castro came to the United States to seek
loans and economic help.

He was turned down and shortly

thereafter the Eisenhower administration put into effect an
economic blockade on Cuban trade.
another.

One retaliation led to

When Cuba had to turn to Russia for crude oil,

American refineries refused to handle it so the Cuban gov
ernment took over the refineries.

In July the United States

cancelled the sugar quota expecting to cripple Cuban econ
omy, but it was rescued by the purchase of sugar by com
munist countries.

On August 6 a large part of the Ameri

can investments in Cuba were nationalized.

Cuba again

offered to pay if the United States would permit the sugar
quota— the only means it had.

On October 19th the United

States placed an embargo on all exports to Cuba except
medicines and certain foods.

On October 25th Cuba

1^Huberman and Sweezy, Anatomy of a Revolution, p.
179; Light and Marzani, Cuba versus CIA, p. 67.
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nationalized all remaining American-owned companies.^
Before the revolution two thirds of Cuba's exports
and three quarters of her imports were provided for in trade
i
with the United States, while trade with the socialist coun
tries played only a small part.

When, almost overnight this

situation was reversed it created many problems.

Many ad

justments had to be made in the manner of handling goods,
an entirely new system of handling and storage had to be de
vised.

Most of Cuba’s automobiles, machinery, etc. are Am

erican made.

The need for replacement parts poses a prob

lem; some have to be bought from a third country that uses
American equipment, some can be secured from the USSR, and
in many cases new parts are made by Cubans themselves.
This imposes grave problems on Cuba, but once overcome it
will undoubtedly work to her benefit--she will be free to
plan and develope her own economy and resources.
A wave of criticism from the United States hit Castro
because he did not set about establishing a permanent gov
ernment under the 19^0 Constitution and hold elections.

If

such an election had been held Castro would have won it
sweepingly--there was no opposition party.

It would have

been as much a farce as a Batista or a Machado election.
Overlooked were meaningless elections in other Latin-American countries.
Amid the frenzied cries of "communism" by sections of
^Ibid., p. 181.
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the United States press, television, and radio, certain ac
complishments of the revolutionary government has been ig
nored.

Progress is infinitely slow, but if the United

States will leave Cuba alone and stop its economic harass
ment, the revolution will succeed.

With United States help

it could be a sweeping success.
Cuba is a dramatic specification of the general bank
ruptcy of United States policies and lack of policies.

It

isn't only Cuba; it is all of Latin America coming out of
its centuries-long isolation.

A land enormously rich--in

soil, timber, coal; it is rich in almost everything people
need to live well.

Yet, in these countries two thirds of

the people live in unbelievable poverty.
Most of the Latin-American countries are run by an
alliance of the military and foreign capital--largely
United States capital.

Foreign aid in the past has been

mostly the giving of arms and other military support in the
name of "hemispheric defense."

Arms that have been used

again and again to enslave the people of the countries that
received them.

In later years attempts have been made to

help industralize these nations, but this has left the
masses in as bad shape as ever.

Too often the aim of the

United States government has been to promote trade and
protect investments by maintaining political stability
among the dominated, irrespective of the form of government,
in order that business might continue without interruption.
Most of the riches and resourses is now in foreign

Ilk
hands.

United States must use its wealth; and its vast

wealth of know-how to make it possible for Latin-American
countries to control all its own resources, help them
create their own capital and develope their own "skills."
There is danger in the lack of people with skill and know
ledge and sensibility.

Education is needed and they do

not have the professional people required in higher insti
tutions of learning.

If the United States is to "export"

something, accomplished teachers will be of greatest help.
An expanded type of "peace corps," seems to provide the best
answer.

Fortunately the myth of Anglo-Saxon superiority

has now been removed, but the hatred it engendered lives
on.

The challenge to all American greatness--North, Cen

tral and South--is to bring into being a "hemispheric
friendship."

The United States, largely responsible for

the hatred, must now provide the impetus for its e r a d i c a 
tion.

It will require the utmost humility, patience, and

perseverence.
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